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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)Q . 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Summary Judgment on Causation Can Only Be Granted Where 
Schindler Shows No Genuine Issues of Material Fact Remain. 
Schindler Only Demonstrated Alternative Theories of Causation, Not a 
Complete Absence of Cause. 
"In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court will view the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party." Walter v. Stewart, 2003 UT App 86, \ 2, 67 P.3d 1042. "The district court's legal 
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment are reviewed for correctness." 
Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, U 8,152 P.3d 312. 
ISSUE 2: An Affidavit Need Only Be Made on Personal Knowledge and May 
Contain Statements Regarding Injury Causation. Florez' Affidavit 
Recited Her Personal Knowledge of Events and Injury Causation. 
"[A] trial court decision to admit evidence is reviewed under a broad grant of 
discretion." Murdoch v. Springville Mum Corp., 1999 UT 39, \ 25, 982 P.2d 65. 
ISSUE 3: Expert Witnesses May Rely on the Testimony and Records of Other 
Witnesses in Reaching Their Conclusions. Dr. Morgan Relied, As Do 
Many Doctors, on the Diagnoses and Records of Other Physicians. 
"The trial court has wide discretion, and such decisions are reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard." Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App 237, \ 20, 74 P.3d 
635. 
1 
ISSUE 4: Reversing Denial of a Motion For New Trial or Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict Requires Marshaling the Evidence and 
Showing How It Could Not Support the Verdict. Schindler Does Not 
Marshal the Evidence. 
Reversing a denied motion for new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
obligates the appealing party to "marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict." Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992). Thereafter, this Court 
reviews "the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the party moved against, and will sustain the denial if reasonable 
minds could disagree with the ground asserted for directing a verdict."' White v. Fox, 665 
P.2d 1297,1300 (Utah 1983). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUES AND RULES OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 
Utah Rule of Evidence 703 
Utah Rule of Evidence 705 
MUJI 2nd CV 2018 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 61 
(full texts attached as Addendum A) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
Defendant Schindler Corporation admitted liability in this personal injury case. Left 
with only causation and amount of damages as a defense, Shindler Corporation chose to 
attack on two fronts. First, they attempted to demonstrate through an exhaustive 
2 
examination of the medical record that their negligence did not cause injury. However, 
Schindler did not even bother to call witnesses who could testify to the major injury suffered 
by Connie, BPPV. Second, perhaps recognizing the weakness in objective facts supporting 
their defense of medical causation, Schindler Corporation chose to attack the credibility and 
personal veracity of the plaintiff, Connie Florez. By personally attacking Connie Florez, 
Schindler opened a door to much of what they claim as error on appeal. Schindler should 
not be allowed to call into question the credibility and veracity of Connie Florez, and then 
claim reversible error when they find testimony and rebuttal argument made by counsel 
unpalatable. 
Following four days of testimony from nine witnesses, eight of the witnesses having 
testified on behalf of Florez, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Florez. Florez submitted 
$23,040 in past medical expenses; the jury awarded her $17,032.31. Florez sought more than 
$125,000 in future medical expenses; the jury awarded her $93,350.00. Counsel argued that 
Florez' loss of quality of life should be equivalent to three or four times the amount the jury 
determined Florez needed for medical care resulting from the incident. The jury's award for 
noneconomic damages was only two times the amount of their determination of Florez' 
economic damages. Clearly, the jury carefully weighed the evidence and argument and 
rendered a balanced verdict which did not give either side all that they were seeking. 
Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review 
1. The Incident and Resulting Lawsuit 
Schindler operated and maintained elevators at the 23rd Street and Wall IRS building 
3 
in Ogden, Utah. Since this IRS building opened in 2001, and for some period after 
Appellee's incident in 2004, Schindler's elevators repeatedly malfunctioned. (R. 185 at 8:21 -
R. 186 at 9:22) In the early summer of 2004, Connie Florez was working at the 23rd Street 
IRS building in Ogden, Utah. While returning from her thirty minute lunch break, 
Schindler's elevator again malfunctioned, coming to a dead stop, and leaving Connie trapped 
inside. (R. 909 at 245-49). 
Approximately seven feet wide by ten feet tall, Schindler's elevator lacked air 
conditioning and cooling. (R. 909 at 251:15-252:2) Florez contacted Schindler for assistance 
by pushing a help button located inside the elevator. (R. 909 at 252:23-253:4) Schindler 
indicated it could be at least an hour before assistance arrived and Schindler would contact 
Florez. (R. 909 at 253:17-18) 
After the initial abrupt halt of the elevator, the elevator made four additional 
movements. As Schindler's elevator repeatedly rose and fell, Florez leaned against the wall 
and gripped onto the rails located inside the elevator. (R. 909 at 249:16-17) As time passed 
and Florez received no contact from Schindler, co-workers gathered, attempting to release 
Florez from the elevator. (R. 909 at 260:1-10) 
The temperature inside the elevator escalated, and so did Florez' anxiety. (R. 909 at 
254:10-255:3) After being trapped for more than thirty minutes in the heat, and along with 
her increasing anxiety, Florez began having heart palpitations. Shouting through the closed 
elevator to co-workers, Florez requested her heart medicine from inside her purse. (R. 909 at 
256:5-11) Florez' co-workers worked together to try and open the doors. The IRS 
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employees pried open the doors just long enough to throw Florez' purse through the small 
opening. (R. 909 at 256:5-11) Florez took a nitroglycerin pill for her palpitating heart. (R. 
909 at 257:2-11) 
After almost an hour after being trapped in Schindler's hot elevator (R. 909 at 255:8-
12) and without Schindler appearing or calling with an update (R. 909 at 257:17-25), two IRS 
employees manipulated an overhead release latch to open the doors, allowing Florez to 
escape the elevator. (R. 908 at 97:4-6; R. 908 at 98:20-25) When the doors opened, Florez 
was sitting on the ground, braced against the wall, fearing further movement of the elevator. 
(R. 908 at 71:25-72:6) She was extremely anxious, tired, and overheated. Although Florez 
looked "scared, very scared" when the doors opened, she came to her feet and attempted to 
exit. (R. 908 at 98:3-9; R. 908 at 128:8-13) 
After taking her first step or two outside of the hot elevator, the cold air hit Florez 
and she blacked out. Florez fell on her left side, hitting her head, ribs and shoulder. (R. 909 
at 267:16-23) Witnesses testified Florez blacked out extremely suddenly, hitting the floor 
"like a sack of potatoes". Eyewitness testimony further indicated Florez' head "bounced" 
off the hard floor and made a "loud noise" when it hit. (R. 908 at 75:8-9; R. 908 at 98:21-22) 
When Florez regained consciousness, she was pale, grey and her body was physically shaking. 
(R. 908 at 79:5 and R. 908 at 130:13-17) Emergency personnel arrived, placed an IV, put 
Florez on a backboard, and transported her to the emergency room. (R. 909 at 262:14-21) 
Florez was extremely nauseous; she repeatedly heaved during the ambulance ride to the 
hospital. (R. 909 at 263:19-25; Plaintiffs Exhibit 115; Defendant's Exhibit 41) 
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At the hospital, E.R. staff attended to Florez. (R. 909 at 264:1-12) Florez had pain in 
her head and her entire left side. (R. 909 at 264:10-14) Florez spent several hours in the 
emergency room; the primary concern was blood work and an EKG to determine if Florez' 
fainting was related to her heart condition. The physician ruled out any heart issue and 
concluded Florez suffered from a "Vasovagal syncopal episode and Hypokalemia," or, in 
laymen's terms, anxiety, nausea, respiratory distress, and fainting due to her stressful situation 
and overheating. Merriam-Webster's Medical Dictionary (1995). (R. 0171 and R. 910 at 375:1-3; 
R. 910 at 379:21-380:13) After determining that Florez had fainted and was not suffering a 
serious heart condition, staff instructed Florez to follow-up with her primary physician for 
additional complaints. (R. 0158) 
The next day, Florez visited a primary care provider. When it was discovered Florez 
had been injured at her workplace, Florez was sent home with instructions to return after 
notifying workers compensation. These facts were documented by the clinic. (R. Plaintiff 
Exhibit 115 at 035) However, Schindler chose to use this forestalled medical visit to attack 
Florez and her supervisor's credibility, implying these witnesses lied when they represented 
Florez missed work the following day to go the doctor. (R. 908 at 92:2-21; R. 911 at 679:16-
680:1) 
Within two days of the incident, Florez received care and began physical therapy 
treatment for her neck and rib injury. Within a few months, multiple providers determined 
that when Florez' head bounced off the ground, the Odoconia in her ear broke, leaving 
Candaliths loose in the ear canal, resulting in a condition called Benign Paroxysmal Positional 
6 
Vertigo or "BPPV." At trial, the Candaliths or loose Odoconia were described, and 
interchangeably referred to, as "crystals" inside of the ear. Once these crystals break, the 
individual experiences permanent vertigo; the vertigo can wax and wane in severity but, it can 
only improve with daily exercises, as well as periodic medication and medical manipulation of 
the ear canal by a trained professional. (R. 909 at 290:10-23; R. 910 at 436:8-22; R. 910 at 
443:15-19; R. 910 at 410:9-17; R. 910 at 467:12-16) 
Schindler argues Florez had BPPV prior to her 2004 fall. However, the medical 
testimony unanimously agrees that trauma causes BPPV. (R. 910 at 476:8-9; R. 910 at 402:3-
6). Schindler offers no evidence, or explanation, of how or when Florez previously injured 
her head and left ear. Instead, Schindler claims that BPPV could be obtained from the 
migraines or viral infections in Florez' history but this was refuted. (R. 910 at 467:17-25; 
R. 910 at 475:6-9) Florez was not diagnosed with BPPV prior to her fall, nor was she given 
the daily treatments or periodic medication needed to treat BPPV prior to her fall. (R. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 116) 
Florez openly admits she experienced prior incidents of dizziness associated with 
miscellaneous medical conditions, particularly with her heart condition and the resulting 
treadmill tests. Yet, Florez had never experienced the persistent, unrelenting, dizziness that 
occurs with BPPV. Individuals can experience dizziness or vertigo for a variety of reasons 
and yet, it does not mean they have BPPV. (R. 910 at 416:23-417:4; R. 910 at 481:23-482:1; 
R. 910 at 403:6-11) 
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Schindler presents an incomplete and erroneous picture, consistently omitting any 
facts or context of prior dizziness. (R. 910 at 405:2-17; R. 908 at 61:11-62:6) Schindler's 
appeal lists nine instances of dizziness complaints over approximately fifteen years. Seven of 
the nine instances were documented when Florez was being treated for her heart1. (R. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 116 at PE 026, 022, 003, 013, 038-39, 030, 058). Schindler refuses to 
accept the medical testimony and insists all records of prior dizziness equate to Florez having 
BPPV prior to 2004 - no medical expert agrees with Schindler's conclusion. 
By contrast, the evidence before the jury and part of the record on appeal, firmly 
establishes Florez' position that the 2004 trauma caused her BPPV. Two years prior to her 
collapse and trauma after exiting the elevator, in March of 2002, an Ear Nose and Throat 
Specialist performed a cDix-Hallpike Maneuver' on Florez when she visited him with vertigo 
and swollen glands. The Dix-Hallpike Maneuver is the initial step, in a series of steps, to 
diagnosing BPPV. A positive Dix-Hallpike causes nystagmus in the patient's eyes. (R. 910 at 
455:18-25) Florez'Dix-Hallpike did not demonstrate BPPV. (R. 910 at 465:20-466:8) The 
March 2002 record referenced an inner ear infection and the physician concluded Florez was 
suffering from inflammation of her ear, not BPPV. (R. 910 at 424:10-12) 
Inflammation of the ear can cause temporary vertigo, but resolves without assistance. 
Consistently, Florez did not complain of vertigo for two years following resolution of the 
diagnosed inflammation. (R. Plaintiffs Exhibit 117) The ENT who conducted the 2002 
1Schindler's brief erroneously cites to tab 2 and 11 of it's trial exhibit; (Schindler's Brief p. 
11, b and g). The citation in those instances should read tab 3 and 14 of Schindler's medical 
exhibit. Also, Schindler's reference to a record dated 12/12/90 should read 12/10/90. 
Florez references the same medical records in Florez' trial exhibit, for the court's 
convenience. 
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examination, relied upon by Schindler as definitive evidence of pre-existing BPPV, was Dr. 
Siddoway. (R. Plaintiffs Exhibit 117) Dr. Siddoway testified at trial and his testimony was 
aggressively challenged by Schindler. Dr. Siddoway remained firm in his conclusion that 
Florez did not suffer from BPPV in 2002. (R. 910 at 465:1-8) 
Dr. Siddoway concluded that Florez began suffering from BPPV in 2004, following 
her fall at the IRS building. (R. 910 at 424:18-425:5) Further, Dr. Siddoway testified that the 
condition that Florez presented with following the fall in 2004 was not the same problem 
that she had two years earlier when she saw him in March of 2002 with vertigo. (R. 910 at 
425:10-12). 
2. Schindler's Motion for Summary Judgment 
On March 13, 2005, Florez filed a Complaint in Second District Court. During two 
years of litigation, Schindler's litigation efforts involved a single discovery request and the 
deposition of Florez. Schindler then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 30, 
2007. (Docket at l).2 Judge Jones presided over Schindler's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denied the request. (R. 0323;0327) 
Schindler premised summary judgment on a two pronged causation argument. First, 
Schindler suggested causation could not be shown because Florez blacked out due to 
nitroglycerin rather than being trapped in the elevator. Schindler offered no medical 
2
 With the exception of deposing Florez' retained expert, Dr. Morgan, after filing the Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Schindler engaged in no other discovery during the entire three years 
of litigation leading up to trial. (Docket at 1-3). Indeed, the whole of Schindler's case on 
appeal is an attempt to take a second bite at the apple. Failing to pursue a meaningful 
defense below, Schindler asks this court to second-guess the district court judges rulings and 
set aside the verdict reached by a jury who, after deliberations, gave Florez less than she 
asked in compensation. 
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testimony or competent, admissible evidence to support their argument. Schindler 
supported their theory of causation solely by reference to an internet website 
www.howthingswork.com. Schindler never produced a medical expert that agreed with their 
position and, ultimately, Schindler abandoned the argument at trial. 
By contrast, Florez attached an affidavit asserting that she had never experienced a 
fainting side effect from her nitroglycerin during the many years she had been on the 
medication. (R. 0179-81) Further, Florez attached the Emergency Room Record, wherein 
the doctor diagnosed her as suffering from a vasovagal syncopal episode and hypokalemia. 
(R. 0217) Perhaps more importantly, it was undisputed that Florez' ingestion of nitroglycerin 
was necessitated by her prolonged entrapment in the elevator. (R. 0173, |^ 1). Accordingly, 
even if the heart medication caused the fainting, Florez only took the medication because of 
anxiety and heart palpitations as a result of being trapped in Schindler's elevator. 
Second, Schindler attacked causation of Florez' BPPV injury by pointing to prior 
episodes of vertigo. In opposition, Florez relied on Dr. Morgan's expert report. Dr. 
Morgan's report indicated Florez suffered a 4% permanent impairment from BPPV related 
to the elevator incident. (R. 0205-11) Schindler, presented no counter-evidence or expert on 
the issue of BPPV. Further, Schindler characterizes Florez' affidavit as her "sole" evidence 
of causation on summary judgment. (Schindler's Brief at 6, \ 1) Although Schindler neglects 
to explain its omission of Dr. Morgan's causation opinion, Schindler assumably interprets 
Dr. Morgan's report as failing to offer a causation opinion. Notably, Judge Jones (R. 907 at 
13:12-25), Judge West (Addendum B, at 26:1-4;) and Dr. Morgan (R. 0399 at 13:17-24; R. 
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910 at 380:11-13; R. 910 at 381:9-12; R. 910 at 382:7-17), all reject such an attempted 
interpretation by Schindler. The record on appeal supports the trial court's finding "that 
there really is a dispute of fact here as to causation". (R. 907 at 13:19-20) 
Under the "Impression" section of Dr. Morgan's Independent Medical Examination, 
it states "Benignpositional vertigo [BPVJ as related to the elevator incident." (R. 0209) Schindler 
complains that the word "causation" is no where in Dr. Morgan's report. (Schindler's Brief 
at pg 6-7, T| 2) Schindler omits that Dr. Morgan utilized the phrase "as related to" the 
elevator incident versus the phrase "as caused by" the elevator incident. Dr. Morgan in his 
deposition was asked ". . . what did you mean by the term cas related to?" and Dr. Morgan's 
response, " - - that was causation related to the elevator accident". (R. 0399 at 13:17-24). 
Dr. Morgan reaffirmed causation at trial. (R. 910 at 380:11-13; R. 910 at 381:9-12; R. 
910 at 382:7-17). Further, at trial Dr. Siddoway confirmed the accuracy of Dr. Morgan's 
opinion by refuting Schindler's argument that Florez' had BPPV in 2002, prior to the fall. 
(R. 910 at 425:10-13; R. 910 at 465:1-8;) 
3. Florez' Affidavit 
In opposition to Schindler's motion for summary judgment, Florez submitted an 
affidavit disputing multiple facts. Florez' affidavit (R. 0179-81) opposed Schindler's 
inaccurate representations that: (1) Florez undisputedly fainted because she ingested 
nitroglycerin; (2) Florez undisputedly suffered no anxiety while inside the elevator; (3) Florez 
undisputedly suffered no symptoms after she fainted; and, (4) Florez obtained no medical 
treatment as a result of the fall. (R. 0162-63; R. 0167) Florez further disputed Schindler's 
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facts with medical records and deposition testimony. (R. 0183-217) Florez simply recited, in 
sequential order, her description of the events that transpired, as set forth above. 
Schindler moved to strike the affidavit of Florez at the trial court and Judge Jones 
denied that request, indicating he did not find Florez' affidavit ". . .out of line. 1 mean 
normally the one who has been injured is the first person you want to talk to find out what 
happened." (R. 907 at 14:7-9) 
4. Dr. Morgan's Testimony 
Prior to trial, Schindler filed a motion to exclude Dr. Morgan, relying on multiple 
arguments. Judge West denied Schindler's motion.3 (R. 656; Addendum B) First, Schindler 
sought to exclude Dr. Morgan because the diagnosis was made by Dr. Siddoway, not Dr. 
Morgan. (R. 353) Second, Schindler argued that Dr. Morgan's opinion was "based not on 
any expertise but rather on a flawed conclusion." (R. 353). However, Schindler offered no 
competing expert opinion or any authority to challenge Dr. Morgan's methods or means by 
which he reached his opinion. 
The evidence of record demonstrates Dr. Morgan is highly competent in evaluating 
causation of injuries as he is the specialist used for this type of exercise of reviewing records 
and performing examinations to determine causation. Dr. Morgan has been performing this 
exact task for over a decade at the request of individuals, other physicians and government 
entities. (R. 910 at 366:15-370:24) 
3Schindler claims that "arguments on Schindler's Motion in Limine were conducted in 
chambers and no transcript of the argument exists". (Schindler's Brief at 2, FN1) In 
actuality, counsel were present when the arguments took place in the courtroom. Florez 
provides the transcript from this hearing as Addendum B. 
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Schindler's campaign against Dr. Morgan derives from isolating incidents in Florez' 
fifty-six year medical history wherein dizziness is noted as a complaint and then using those 
instances to conclude Dr. Morgan's opinion is wrong, and therefore, incompetent. (R. 0366, 
TJ3) Schindler is unable to produce a medical expert to medically validate Schindler's position. 
More specifically, Schindler has been unable to establish any of the prior instances amounted 
to BPPV rather than just dizziness as a symptom associated with heart arrhythmia or viral 
inflammation. The unrefuted and unchallenged testimony from the medical experts is that 
Florez' prior dizziness did not equate to BPPV. (R. 910 at 425:10-13) 
5. Testimony and Notice of Florez' Medical Expenses 
Schindler requests a directed verdict by representing Florez "did not present one 
shred of evidence" on Florez' medical expenses. (Schindler's Brief at 43, In 4-5) In actuality, 
three medical experts4 testified to the summary of medical expenses incurred by Florez and 
admitted into evidence. (R. Plaintiffs Exhibit 117) First, Dr. Morgan testified he refers 
individuals out routinely as part of his work for workers compensation and therefore, has 
knowledge of medical costs in the community. He testified he reviewed the costs detailed in 
Florez' Medical Expense Summary and found them to be reasonable and necessarily incurred 
as a result of the 2004 elevator incident. (R. 910 at 383:22-384:8) Second, Dr. Amann's 
testimony confirmed the reasonableness and need for Florez' neck and rib expenses. (R. 909 
4Contrary to Schindler's representation, Dr. Amann and Dr. .Siddoway were not precluded 
from offering expert testimony. (Schindler's Brief at 7-8) Rather, the trial court found that 
without production of a Rule 26 report, the treating physicians could "give opinions, expert 
opinions, within their expertise . . ." but, they were not allowed to "extrapolate it out", i.e. 
offer legal causation. (Addendum B at 17:15-19; R. 909 at 154:13-155:8) There is no 
evidence the physicians exceeded this one limitation set by the court. 
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at 186:9 - 188:22) Third, Dr. Siddoway's testimony confirmed the reasonableness of 
expenses specific to Florez' BPPV. (R. 910 at 447:3-448:19) 
Florez' medical expense summary was properly admitted under Rule 1006 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Schindler alleges error, claiming Schindler never received the underlying 
invoices required by Rule 1006. (Schindler's Brief at 43, In 5) However, the record 
demonstrates eight occasions, prior to trial, on which Schindler had been provided the 
invoices underlying Florez' medical expense summary. (R. 0518) The ninth production 
occurred the first day of trial, in front of the court. The trial court found Schindler had 
received notice of the underlying expenses. (R. 911 at 729:12-14) 
Based on the court's ruling of notice, Florez' never burdened the jury with the 
overwhelming invoices. Yet, due to Schindler's unrelenting objection that Florez' summary 
was insufficient without the invoices, Florez stipulated to Schindler providing the jury with 
four medical expense summaries created by Schindler. (R. 911 at 722:6-729:10; R. 0638-42) 
Evidencing Schindler had received the underlying invoices, Schindler's counsel created its 
own medical expense summaries. (R. 911 at 689:3-12) Those summaries reflected 
Schindler's various arguments, i.e. the majority of expenses can actually be discounted as 
treatment for neck and back (R. 911 at 689:13-23) only two thousand of the expenses are 
related to her rib injury, (R. 911 at 693:19-694:1), you should only award the ER visit and 
ambulance ride (R. 911 at 703:15-704:4), etc. While Florez disagreed with Schindler's 
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categorization of Florez' expenses, these summaries were provided to the jury and nullify any 
alleged prejudice to Schindler. Schindler's compilation and submission of its own medical 
expense summaries to the jury demonstrates adequate access to the invoices underlying 
Florez' medical expense summary. (R. 0638-42) 
With respect to Florez' future medical expenses, no itemized numbers were admitted 
into evidence. The jury was asked to determine this amount based on the medical testimony 
that Florez' future care would be consistent with her maintenance care over the last few 
years. Specifically, Florez' first two years of care were more expensive because of costs 
related to the testing and diagnosing of her condition but, following that initial two years, 
Florez had reached medical stability. Upon reaching medical stability, Florez' medical care 
became maintenance care that would continue indefinitely. (R. 909 at 185:4-186:12; R. 910 at 
449:5-11) Florez' maintenance care involved itemized costs for periodic doctor visits, 
audiological therapy, and medications. (R. Plaintiffs Exhibit 117) Based on the evidence, 
counsel's closing included arguments for assessing future damages consistent with the 
maintenance care Florez had been receiving at the direction of Dr. Amann and Dr. Siddoway 
since 2006. (R. 911 at 650:8-665:25) 
6- Jury Instruction on Pre-Existing Condition 
Schindler claims Florez failed to establish she had a pre-existing BPPV condition. 
(Schindler's Brief at 8, J^ 2) This is accurate. Florez did not introduce evidence of a pre-
15 
existing condition. At trial, Florez maintained her BPPV was a result of the 2004 incident 
and was not pre-existing. Yet, Schindler omits that Schindler asserted Florez' BPPV pre-
existed the elevator incident. (Schindler's Brief at 45-47) 
Schindler's primary defense was that Florez had not been injured. Schindler's 
secondary defense was that even if the jury found Florez had been injured, Florez' BPPV 
was pre-existing. (R. 908 at 55:2-6; 58-63; 64:2-12) With Schindler's defense, the trial court 
believed it appropriate to instruct the jury on how to determine damages, if any, in light of a 
pre-existing condition. (R. 910 at 559:6 - 601:17) 
7. Opening & Closing Arguments 
Schindler asserts a variety of allegations on appeal based on counsel's comments 
during opening and closing. Schindler's approach to counsel's arguments, mirrors their 
attack on Florez' BPPV. Schindler abstracts miscellaneous comments, without reference to 
context, to create an alleged condition of prejudice against Schindler. This condition simply 
did not exist. The record, including the insurmountable fact that Schindler did not object to 
the comments now cited on appeal, demonstrates there was no prejudicial attack levied 
against Schindler because of their corporate status or size. 
On the contrary, this was a case where Schindler had insufficient evidence and thus, 
choose to attack the credibility of Florez, witnesses, and counsel. Counsel's comments were 
made in defense to Schindler's trial tactic of bullying every witness, medical provider, and 
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counsel.5 The trial court's ruling best illustrates the accurate condition at trial. In rejecting 
Schindler's request for a new trial, Judge West ruled: 
"[T]his was a hard fought, hotiy contested, jury trial. Emotions did run high. 
A lot was at stake. Although the Court does not completely condone some of 
the comments made by the Plaintiffs attorney during closing argument, taken 
as a whole and in context, those comments did not rise to the level of invoking 
the passion and prejudice of the jury. The juries' verdict appears well thought 
out, rational, and not the result of passion or prejudice. It was not a 'runaway' 
jury. It was not an excessive verdict. The verdict was well within the 
discretion and prerogative of the jury" (R. at 0853, |^ 2) 
In addition to arguing there were multiple offensive comments without any 
specificity, Schindler cites to two, specific, instances that allegedly warrant a new trial. First, 
5Since Schindler hadn't contacted anyone, Schindler suggested Mr. Ward spoke to witnesses 
improperly, manipulating testimony in conspiracy against Schindler (R. 911 at 676:23-677:4; 
R. 910 at 451:3-10), arguing " Mr. Ward came in with his preconceived story and he tried to 
get these witnesses to fit within his preconceived story". (R. 911 at 678:2-3) 
Schindler's exhibit represented Florez was seen by Dr. Siddoway in 2003 for BPPV, less than 
a year before the elevator incident, even though Schindler knew there was no medical record 
for that date. After Dr. Siddoway testified under oath that there was no record because there 
was no such visit, Schindler suggested Dr. Siddoway was lying, i.e. hiding the record. (R. 911 
at 675:21-676:3; 676:23-677:4) Notably, Dr. Siddoway was not hired by Florez and did not 
want to testify at trial; Dr. Siddoway had to be subpoenaed. Schindler's attack against Dr. 
Siddoway demonstrates why treating physicians are unwilling to provide relevant testimony. 
Schindler questioned where the overhead projector went and said Florez' counsel "took it 
away" because, Mr. Ward "doesn't want you to look at the evidence". (R.911 at 674:8-9; R. 
911 at 674:21-22) 
Schindler was so adversarial and contentious at trial that counsel objected over 75 times and 
to things such as Mr. Ward's reference to a record as "9" of 2004, instead of "September" of 
2004 (R. 910 at 432:19-433:8) and Mr. Ward referencing records without first making sure he 
explained where that record was in Schindler's exhibit (R. 910 at 428:3-429:18; R. 910 at 432:1-
16). Yet, notably, Schindler did not object to the comments now claimed prejudicial, 
demonstrating the benign tone and insignificance of these comments at trial. 
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Schindler asserts counsel's arguments erroneously instructed the jury that Florez had a 25 
year life expectancy. (Schindler's Brief at 23, No. 76 ) The record does not support 
Schindler's assertion. During closing, counsel conducted a demonstration on calculating 
future medical expenses based on the doctors testimony and the summaries of past medical 
expenses. As part of this demonstration, counsel needed to use a figure for sake of argument 
but, it was made clear that counsel was not relying on any evidence: 
"Now, then the question becomes, well, how long is Connie's future? No one 
knows. . . Nobody know, so you know, as I've looked and thought about it and 
looked at the average side of this, we figured a fair thing was 25 years. She's 
58 now, that would make her about 83. . .and by the way,you 're not bound by this 
... If you think, <CI don't think she'll live more than 20 years", you can do that... I 
mean, we don't claim we have a crystal ball We're just trying to be fair." (R. 911 at 
663:2-14)(emphasis added) 
Counsel did not misrepresent there had been medical evidence that Florez would live an 
additional 25 years. Moreover, Schindler did not object to the above comment at trial. 
Second, Schindler states on appeal that Flore2' counsel misrepresented the law to the 
jury during closing arguments. (Schindler's Brief at 49) The record, including the context of 
the comments, demonstrate this did not occur. 
During closing, Schindler's counsel attacked the credibility of Dr. Siddoway. (R. 911 
at 675:21-676:3; 676:23-677:4) In response, Florez' counsel stated "So what that he doesn't 
agree with Dr. Siddoway? That doesn't mean anything, folks. Don't let yourself be swayed 
by that kind of nonsense. He had an obligation to bring in a doctor to say Dr. Siddoway is 
wrong and he didn't. He just didn't." (R. 911 at 709:17-22) 
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Schindler objected, informing the court that Florez' counsel had just testified that 
Schindler had a legal obligation to bring in medical witnesses. Florez5 counsel responded by 
indicating he was referring to a substantive obligation, he did not represent it was a "legal" 
obligation. In front of the jury, Schindler convinced the court that Florez' counsel had, 
indeed, stated "legal" obligation. To avoid more useless bickering, and out of respect for 
the trial court, Florez' counsel took the blame. Counsel turned to the jury and stated " I take 
it back. He doesn't have a legal obligation to bring anybody in." The record accurately 
reflects counsel did not state Schindler had a "legal" obligation to bring in a doctor to refute 
Dr. Siddoway. (R. 911 at 709:18-710:14) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Schindler presents four issues on appeal. 
Summary Judgment: Schindler contends the trial court erred in denying its motion 
for summary judgment. However, summary judgment may only be granted where the 
moving party demonstrates that no genuine issues of material fact remain. Schindler argued 
summary judgment by presenting an alternative theory of causation, yet failing to provide any 
evidence or expert testimony which could support its theory. Schindler's sole authority used 
to demonstrate 'no genuine issue of material fact' consisted of citing a website, 
www.howstuffworks.com. Even accepting their theory has plausibility in the absence of 
evidence and testimony, the argument cannot demonstrate the absence of genuine material 
fact, precluding summary judgment. Namely, Schindler claimed that the nitroglycerin pills 
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caused Connie to faint and, therefore, caused the head injury. Schindler's argument ignores 
the fact that being trapped in the elevator caused Connie to ingest the nitroglycerin pills. 
Schindler also suggests that Florez5 BPPV was not caused by the fall and points to a 
large number of pre-fall vertigo incidents. Although BPPV induces vertigo, the mechanism 
is significantly different from that which caused Connie's prior episodes. BPPV induces 
vertigo through the inner ear and the mechanism of inducement was diagnosed in Florez and 
supported by medical testimony. Simply by showing the instances of prior episodes and 
attacking the credibility of the medical witnesses, Schindler argued no genuine issues 
remained regarding causation of the BPPV. Schindler's attack, however, failed to 
demonstrate no genuine issues of material fact remained and, more importantly, it also failed 
to convince the jury on this theory as well. 
Florez Affidavit: Schindler suggests the trial court erred in not striking Florez' 
affidavit. Because Florez' affidavit was based on personal knowledge and merely recited the 
sequence of events as they occurred, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
strike the affidavit. Additionally, refusing to strike the affidavit does not create grounds for 
reversal where other competent evidence prevented summary judgment 
Dr. Morgan as Expert Witness: Dr. Morgan's extensive experience as an independent 
medical exam reviewer for workers compensation, his training and background all 
demonstrate his ability to review, summarize and offer opinions and conclusions regarding 
the need for medical intervention and the cause of injury. The trial court did not abuse its 
considerable and wide discretion in admitting Dr. Morgan as an expert. 
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Motion for New Trial/Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict: In order to overturn 
a denial of a motion for new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appealing 
party must marshal all the evidence and demonstrate how, taking all facts and inferences in a 
light most favorable to the other side, the wrong result was nonetheless reached. Schindler 
does not marshal the evidence and demonstrate how the outcome is outside the bounds of 
reason. 
ISSUE I BECAUSE SCHINDLER FAILED TO SHOW FLOREZ' INJURIES 
WERE NOT CAUSED BY THEIR NEGLIGENCE, THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY DENIED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no 
genuine issues of material fact remain. "Unless the moving party meets its initial burden to 
present evidence establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the party opposing 
the motion is under no obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial." 
Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 445 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). "Utah law does not allow 
a summary judgment movant to merely point out a lack of evidence in the nonmoving party's 
case, but instead requires a movant to affirmatively provide factual evidence establishing that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, Tf 15, 177 P.3d 600 
(emphasis added). 
Schindler's motion for summary judgment first argued the heart medication caused 
Connie Flore2 to faint. Being trapped in the Schindler elevator necessitated taking the heart 
medication in the first instance. Further, Schindler's attempt to prove that the heart 
medication caused Connie to faint, rather than the heat and anxiety of being trapped in the 
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elevator, consisted of citing a single article taken from an internet website, 
"www.howstuffworks.com." (R. 101). This Court should disregard and give no 
consideration to Schindler's authority because it is inadmissible evidence lacking in 
foundation and entirely hearsay unsupported by any medical opinion and, therefore, 
incapable of supporting a motion for summary judgment. See D&L Supply v. Saurini, 775 
P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) ("It is true that inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment."). 
Although argument regarding the admissibility of an internet article was not raised 
below, this Court may affirm the lower court's denial of summary judgment on any basis 
which it finds legally viable. An "appellate court will affirm the judgment. . . appealed from 
if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such 
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court. . . [and] even though such 
ground or theory . . . was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on 
by the lower court." State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Because an 
internet website, www.howstuffworks.com. is neither authoritative nor admissible evidence, 
Schindler's argument for overturning denial of summary judgment must be refused. 
Further, citing a single website as authority for the proposition that this plaintiff fell 
because of nitroglycerin and not because of the fear, anxiety and heat exposure strains 
credibility and cannot demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact remain. "[B]ecause 
negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from the facts, which is properly 
done by juries rather than judges, summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only 
22 
in the clearest instances." Sandberg v. Lehman, Jensen & Donahue, L.C., 2003 UT App 272, j^ 5, 
76 P.3d 699. Indeed, the 'howstuffworks' web article, at best, suggests that the heart 
medication "may" cause 'dizziness [or] lightheadedness.' (R. 102). Because Schindler did not 
prove that Florez fainted from the heart medication, Florez was not even obligated to 
respond to the argument with competing evidence. Accordingly, the trial court correctly 
denied summary judgment on this argument even in the absence of a response from Florez. 
Additionally, Florez' affidavit provided disputed facts that she never previously 
experienced a fainting episode associated with taking her heart medication. Florez' affidavit 
affirmatively generates a genuine issue of material fact in the face of literature stating that the 
medication "may" cause dizziness. In other words, the medication doesn't cause fainting in 
everyone, all the time and, in Connie's experience, it had not caused fainting in her at any 
time. All inferences from the presented facts must be taken in favor of the non-moving 
party. See 3D Constr. & Dev., LL C v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 307,1f 1 n. 2, 
117 P. 3d 1082 ("we review the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party"). Taking all inferences regarding these facts in 
favor of Florez, the trial court correctly denied summary judgment. 
Second, Schindler argued that Florez' prior episodes of vertigo showed that her 
present vertigo was not caused by their negligence. However, the argument ignores the 
distinction between Florez' prior transitory episodes of vertigo and those caused by BPPV, a 
permanent condition brought on by inner ear mechanisms. Schindler offered no medical 
testimony, or competent admissible evidence, to back up their theory for summary judgment. 
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In effect, Schindler provided only an alternative basis for the vertigo but, did not prove that 
the present injury was solely a preexisting condition. At best, Schindler's motion presented 
an alternative theory of causation, but did not meet their burden of demonstrating no 
material fact remained on the issue of causation. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied 
the motion for summary judgment. 
Causation, including proximate cause, cannot typically be resolved on motion for 
summary judgment and remains within the unique province of the jury's fact finding mission. 
"This very dispute [on the issue of causation] creates an issue of fact within the province of 
the jury." Nay v. General Motors Corp,, 850 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1993). ("[Djoubts about 
whether a nonmovant has established a genuine issue of material fact should be resolved in 
favor of permitting the party to go to trial"); Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 104 (Utah 
1992) citing Rees v. Albertson's Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978). Here, assuming arguendo, 
that Schindler has proven something other than its negligence caused Florez' BPPV, Florez 
presented more than adequate evidence to require the matter be submitted to the jury. 
Schindler relies on Clark v. Partners Ins Exchange, 893 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1995) to 
assert Florez had a higher burden on causation than merely demonstrating a material factual 
dispute. Schindler's reliance is misplaced. First, unlike Clark, Florez presents medical 
evidence of causation through Dr. Morgan. Second, Clark is easily distinguishable in that no 
one, including Clark, knew how Clark had been hurt. Id. at 601. Here, Florez provides 
deposition testimony, medical records, and a Rule 59(e) affidavit explaining how she was 
injured. At trial, five eye witnesses confirmed Florez' description of events. Further, Dr. 
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Morgan assigned Florez a 4% permanent impairment due to the BPPV as a result of the 
elevator incident. 
With the introduction of Dr. Morgan's permanent impairment rating, Schindler's 
request for summary disposition should fail. Schindler's appeal either omits Florez' 
permanent impairment or, mentions it in an effort to discredit the evaluator, Dr. Morgan. 
Schindler omits Dr. Morgan's causation opinion because Dr. Morgan does not use the word, 
"causation", in his expert report. In opining on Florez' BPPV, Dr. Morgan uses the term 
"related to the 2004 elevator incident" rather than "caused by the 2004 incident". Schindler 
also omits Dr. Morgan's deposition testimony, wherein he clarified that when he used the 
term "related to" in his report, he was referring to "causation". (R. 0399 at pg. 13, In 21-24). 
Although Dr. Morgan had not yet been deposed at the time Schindler filed its motion for 
summary judgment, despite a pending scheduling order that allowed for more than five 
months of expert discovery, an expert's use of the term "related to" has been found to be 
sufficient evidence of causation to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the phrase "related to" in Red/and Soccer 
Club, Inc. v. Department of Army, 55 F.3d 827,852 (3rd Cir.1995). The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals found it error to grant summary judgment on causation when the doctor's 
statement was that the [plaintiffs] illnesses were "related to" defendant's negligence. (Id. at 
851). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that ". . .causation 
does not require that expert testimony include any 'magic words' such as 'caused by,' 
rather than 'related to.'" Red/and at 853. The Third Circuit further reiterated "expert medical 
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opinion on causation need not be unqualified and absolute, i.e., stated in 'categorical terms'; 
citing Gradelv. Inouye, 421 A.2d 674 (Pa. 1980). 
In a footnote, the Red/and court recognized that evidence presented at the time of a 
motion for summary judgment may not always be definitive on an issue, stating, "[o]f course, 
if it could be shown, by cross-examination or otherwise, that [plaintiffs doctor] used the 
term "relation" to mean "correlation" in the statical sense instead of cause in either the 
medical or legal sense, the force of his testimony could be significantly affected." Redland at 
N. 16. Still, it was unequivocal that "for summary judgment purposes, however, we believe 
that the [plaintiffs] have introduced sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding causation." Id. at 852. 
Utah courts similarly conclude that "magic words" are not needed to effectuate legal 
principles. See, Rinderknecht v. Luck, 965 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah App. 1998) (finding "magic 
words' don't equate to binding contract); Matter of Estate of Burgess, 836 P.2d 1386, 1395 (Utah 
App. 1992) (holding Utah code's approach is to eliminate unnecessary, ritualistic formality 
and "magic words"); State v. Dunkel, 2006 UT App 339, ^ 14, 143 P.3d 290 (withdrawal of 
consent to search need not be effectuated through cmagic words' (citing U.S. v. Gray, 369 
F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004)); Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah App. 
1993) (trial court did not need to use "magic words" in its finding); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 
P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998) (in a bad faith case, trial court was not expressly required to use 
"magic words of bad faith" in determining applicability of Utah code provision). 
26 
At a very minimum, causation could be inferred from Dr. Morgan's report. 
Causation can be inferred with the purpose of viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party on summary judgment. See Butterfield v. Okubo 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 
1992); Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein <& Yielding 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah 1996). Even though at the 
summary judgment stage "plaintiff s causation theory may appear somewhat strained, it is the 
province of the jury . . . to determine whether the causation theory is fatally attenuated." Id. 
at 1292 (citation omitted). 
Finally, credibility judgments and argument regarding the weight of the evidence 
cannot provide a basis on which to grant summary judgment. "It is not the purpose of the 
summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of parties, or 
witnesses, or the weight of evidence." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein <& Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 
1292 (Utah App. 1996). Contrary to this clear requirement, Schindler improperly relies on 
weighing Florez5 expert tesimony and report to request summary judgment. 
When the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light 
most favorable to Flore2, the trial court correctly denied summary judgment and Schindler 
provides no basis on which this Court could find an error needing correction by reversal. 
ISSUE II THE COURT CORRECTLY DENIED SCHINDLER'S REQUEST 
TO STRIKE FLOREZ' AFFIDAVIT 
The review of affidavits is a "highly fact-dependent question," granting the trial court 
broad discretion in determining whether the affidavit was correctly based on Florez's 
personal knowledge. Superior Receivable Services v. Pett, 2008 UT App 225, ^ j 10, 191 P.3d 31 
(upholding trial court's denial of motion to strike affidavit finding that plaintiffs statements 
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were not opinion, rather based on her personal knowledge and memory which would be 
admissible at trial); See Brown v. Jorgensen, 2008 UT App 225, \ 21,136 P.3d 1252 (although 
defendant's affidavit contained inadmissible hearsay (properly disregarded by the trial court) 
the affidavit also contained statements based on defendant's personal knowledge, thus did 
not violate Rule 56(e)). 
Florez' affidavit, in summary and relevant to the issues raised by Schindler on appeal, 
stated she suffered an "anxiety attack which caused significant emotional and physical 
distress" while trapped in the elevator. (R. 179). Florez further related her experience that, 
because of this distress, "I fainted when the doors were pried open and I was assisted from 
the elevator car . . . I fell to the floor on my left side and my head hit the floor hard." (R. 
0180). Additionally, Florez stated that following the incident she "suffered significant vertigo 
and dizziness after the fall, which has continued to the present." (Id.). Florez' statements are 
based on her personal knowledge of what she experienced when exiting the elevator, and 
what she continued to experience including the vertigo and dizziness after the fall. 
Although some of the language in the affidavit contained statements which might be 
colored as 'medical' and 'causation' by Schindler, this alone does not provide a basis on 
which to strike the statements.6 In reviewing Connie's affidavit, the trial court indicated that 
"There's no question that some of this is her opinion and it didn't seem to me that her 
opinion was that out of line." (R. 907 at 14:5-7) Florez was describing what she experienced, 
in a sequential manner, as would any person describing events in their life. The fact that 
6In the trial court below, Schindler also contended that Florez' affidavit 'contradicted' her 
prior deposition testimony and the affidavit should have been stricken on that basis as well. 
(R. 0220). Schindler abandons that argument on appeal. 
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Florez' description of her injuries may have utilized medical terms does not equate to her 
attempting to offer medical testimony. All medical evidence was offered through Dr. 
Morgan's report and the introduction of admissible medical records. (R. 0183-217) Florez' 
affidavit simply described what she felt and experienced when she fainted after exiting the 
elevator. 
Additionally, the case authority relied upon by Schindler fails to support striking the 
affidavit. Schindler cites Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, H 15, 12 P.3d 1015 as 
support for the proposition that "a lay person cannot offer testimony regarding medical 
conditions, causation, diagnoses or treatment." (Schindler's Brief p. 32). However, Beard 
expressly allowed such causation lay testimony and excluded lay testimony from its holding. 
"In this case, the question is not whether the accident at K-Mart caused Beard injury, but 
rather whether injuries sustained as a result of the accident at K-Mart required the 
neurological surgeries." Wat 1019. Schindler does not contend on appeal that Florez lacked 
expert witness testimony establishing the need for her treatment. 
More importantly, Beard went on to hold it is entirely permissible for a plaintiff to 
offer testimony regarding the cause of their injury and pain. "Beard was properly permitted 
to testify that the accident in the store caused pain and injury. The question as to whether 
such pain and injury resulted from the blow is within the common knowledge and experience 
of lay witnesses." Id. at 1019. 
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Indeed, it is common knowledge that people faint in response to traumatic or 
frightening events as demonstrated by individuals who pass out when they have blood 
drawn, or the somewhat pejorative stereotype of the housewife who passes out at the sight of 
a mouse. For Florez to relate via affidavit her experience that she passed out after 
experiencing the trauma and fear of being trapped in a hot elevator for over an hour goes 
beyond nothing in the common everyday understanding of our world. Schindler presents no 
facts or authority to show that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Florez1 
affidavit and this Court should refuse to overturn that decision. 
ISSUE III SCHINDLER DEMONSTRATES NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN 
PERMITTING DR. MORGAN TO TESTIFY. 
Schindler suggests that Dr. Morgan should have been prevented from testifying as an 
expert on two bases: (1) Dr. Morgan's expert report allegedly lacked any mention of 
'causation5 and Dr. Morgan should have, therefore, been prevented from testifying regarding 
causation; and, (2) Dr. Morgan lacked the area of expertise necessary to testify regarding 
causation. Absent an abuse of discretion, appellate courts will not reverse the trial court's 
decision to allow an expert witness to testify. "The determination as to who qualifies as an 
expert witness and the admissibility of the witness's testimony falls within the discretion of 
the trial court. Absent a clear abuse of this discretion, we will not reverse the trial court's 
determination." Evans ex rel Evans v. Langston, 2007 UT App 240, j^ 6, 166 P.3d 621. Neither 
of Schindler's arguments demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion in allowing Schindler to 
testify. 
30 
1. The Trial Court Properly Found Schindler Had Notice of Dr. Morgan's Causation 
Opinion 
Schindler acknowledges the "purpose of an expert report is to 'give the opposing 
party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony.'" (Schindler's Brief at 34). Schindler 
asserts it did not receive notice that Florez intended to offer causation through Dr. Morgan. 
However, the record demonstrates Schindler had notice, but sought to impose a strained 
linguistic interpretation of Dr. Morgan's expert report. 
First, Schindler had unqualified notice through Florez' opposition to Schindler's 
motion for summary judgment. Moreover, any question regarding Dr. Morgan's causation 
opinion was quickly answered via Dr. Morgan's deposition, wherein he unequivocally stated 
that "I have causation right here. It's due to the elevator accident." (R. 0399 16:13-14) 
At the hearing on Schindler's motion in limine, the trial court thoughtfully reviewed 
Dr. Morgan's report and made a record of the appropriate paragraphs on causation before 
ruling Dr. Morgan was allowed to testify on causation. (Addendum B at 24:20 -25:4;32:18-
33:15) Despite this clear ruling on Schindler's motion in limine, Schindler repeated the same 
notice objections at trial, (R. 375:13-379:15; R. 380:948; R. 385:6-13) prompting the trial 
court to remind Schindler: 
" I really don't have problems with the fact that either side in this case has 
received notice of issues. This goes to the heart of my disagreement with Mr. 
Lilja [Schindler's counsel] on the reading the report from the one doctor. I 
think he was absolutely put on notice. Could this report have been written 
better and could have had more specificity when we're talking about the 
muscle/skeletal things? Yes. But I really think he was put on notice and he 
knew that that's what the doctor's opinion is going to be. I don't have any 
doubt your gave him notice about these things." (R. 908 at 589:9-18) 
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2. It Was Within the Trial Court's Discretion to Find Dr. Morgan Competent to Testify 
on Causation 
Schindler completely ignores Flore2' presentation of Dr. Morgan's proper testimony 
under Rule 702 and 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (R. 0421-0426). Instead, Schindler 
argues the court exceeded its wide discretion in this case because Dr. Morgan relies on an 
underlying diagnosis made by an ENT. Consistent with the Rules of Evidence, Utah courts 
recognize that an expert witness may rely upon the testimony and other records of evidence 
in reaching their opinions. In Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah 1974), the expert 
"testified that his opinion was based on the testimony he had heard and the records in 
evidence." The defendant moved to exclude the expert's testimony because he relied on the 
testimony of other witnesses and other records. The court refused to strike or exclude the 
expert holding that such a "challenge to the reliability of such expert testimony will be 
considered as not involving its competency but its weight and credibility, which is a matter 
for the jury to determine." Id. at 608. 
Consistently, the trial court found: 
"if Dr. Siddoway takes the stand and testified that he did a diagnosis . . . And 
then Dr. Morgan takes the stand and says, I relied up Dr. Siddoway's diagnosis 
to conclude [causation] . . . then I don't see why that testimony's not 
admissible. You can always attack Dr. Siddoway for the prognosis or the 
diagnosis in the first place. You can always attack Dr. Morgan for relying 
upon it. . . But is seems to me the doctors are testifying on two different 
issues, but they are entitled to rely upon each other's diagnosis." (Addendum B 
at 13:14-14:11) 
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Federal Notes of the Advisory Committee corroborate the trial court's decision: 
[a] physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information from 
numerous sources and of considerable variety, including statements by patients 
and relatives, reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors, 
hospital records, and X rays . . . His validation, expertly performed and subject 
to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes. Notes of the 
Advisory Committee on Rule 703 
Because of Dr. Morgan's reliance upon Dr. Siddoway, Schindler concludes Dr. 
Morgan's testimony is outside of his expertise. This deduction is a fallacy. Causation is Dr. 
Morgan's expertise. Dr. Morgan testified how, as a doctor who rehabilitates injuries, a large 
part of his training and speciality is in performing causation evaluations; he conducts these 
examinations on weekly basis. Dr. Morgan admitted that although he had not offered a 
causation opinion on BPPV at trial before, he does treat patients who suffer from this injury. 
Dr. Morgan also testified that in addition to relying upon the ENTs, his record review and 
his examination, he "boned up" on medical research into the causes of BPPV before offering 
his opinion. (R. 910 at 408:2-410:12) 
Schindler erroneously relies on medical malpractice cases for the assertion that a 
board certified physiatrist cannot testify to causation of BPPV. (Schindler's Brief at 35-37) 
However, the cases relied upon stand for the proposition that one expert witness, in a medical 
malpractice case, may not testify as to the standard of care to be used by a medical professional in 
a different specialty. Standard of care is not at issue in this case. 
Similarly, Schindler cities to a series of extra-jurisdictional cases that are factually 
inapplicable by abstracting isolated quotes from the cases to imply the cases are consistent 
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with Schindler's position. A closer look at these cases demonstrate they are dissimilar and 
unsupportive to Schindler's plight.7 
Applicable case law indicates that "an expert witness is not strictly confined to his 
area of practice, but may testify concerning related applications; lack of specialization does 
not affect the admissibility of the opinion, but only its weight." Wheeler v. John Deere Co, 935 
F. 2d 1090, 1101 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding psychiatrist could offer a human factors opinion 
on the design of a product). Similarly, it has been found to be an abuse of discretion to 
restrict or exclude expert testimony based upon the lack of a particular, or preferred 
speciality. See, Ho/brook v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3rd Cir. 1996) (finding it 
error to exclude internist's testimony on whether radiation can cause alleged injury simply 
because doctor was not an oncologist who may have more experience with radiation; also 
affirming court's finding that doctors' testimony based solely on review of plaintiff s history 
and medical literature was sufficient to satisfy Daubert Id. at 785.); In re PaoliKK YardPCB 
Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 856 (3rd Cir. 1990) ("The district court's insistence on a certain kind 
of degree or background is inconsistent with our jurisprudence in this area. The language of 
7Bemson v. Silverman, 233 111. App. 689, 698 (111. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1992) dealt with standard of 
care in medical malpractice; Pere% v. City of Austin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36776 (W. Dist. 
Texas May 5, 2008) found a psychologist didn't need prior experience or specific expertise 
in "police psychology" to render expert psychological opinion in a police case; Davison v. 
Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 84 P.3d 1023,1026 (Colo. 2004) upheld, under Colorado statute, 
you must have a medical or psychological expert to assert "mental trauma"; Wint^ v. Northrop 
Corp., 110 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 1997) upheld the district court's discretion in determining 
proposed expert did not meet Federal Daubert qualifications; Cromer v. Mulkey 'Enters., 254 Ga. 
App. 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) prevented a biomechanist from exceeding his limited role by 
offering medical testimony; Sinkfteld v. Oh, 229 Ga. App. 883, 886 (Ga. Ct App. 1997) found 
it error to exclude Pharmacist's testimony regarding the effects of Motrin 800 in a pregnancy 
simply because he was not of the same medical speciality as the Obstetricians. 
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Rule 702 and the accompanying advisory committee notes make clear that various kinds of 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, qualify an expert as such . . . In light of 
the liberal Rule 702 expert qualification standard, we hold that the district court abused its 
discretion by excluding [medical] testimony simply because the experts did not have the 
degree or training which the district court apparently thought would be most appropriate.") 
Schindler does not attack Dr. Morgan's legitimate qualifications and experience in 
determining causation but rather, relies on its assertion that Dr. Morgan isn't the best 
qualified to render causation in this case because he relied upon the diagnosis of Dr. 
Siddoway. The trial court was within its discretion to deny Schindler's Motion to exclude Dr, 
Morgan and allow Schindler to liberally attack the weight of Dr. Morgan's, and Dr. 
Siddoway's, testimony at trial. 
ISSUE IV WHEN VIEWING THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO FLOREZ, THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE JURY5S VERDICT. 
1. Schindler Does Not Meet the Legal Requirements for Obtaining a New Trial 
Reviewing appellate courts sustain the denial of a motion for new trial if there is 
simply an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision. "Where the trial court has denied the 
motion for new trial, its decision will be sustained on appeal if there was an evidentiary basis 
for the jury's decision." Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982). Indeed, reversal of 
a denied motion for new trial only occurs if the moving party can show "the evidence to 
support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the 
verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." Id. at 732. 
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In order to meet this burden, the party seeking to challenge denial of a motion for 
new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict carries a very high burden. The decision 
of the trial court will only be reversed if "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prevailing party, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict." 
Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992). Moreover, it is Appellant Schindler's 
obligation and burden to "marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict." Id. at 839. Here, the bulk of Schindler's attack amounts to insufficiency of the 
evidence. Yet, Schindler wholly fails to marshal all evidence and demonstrate a deficiency so 
great as to warrant setting the verdict aside on appeal. 
Schindler omits Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as a 
determinative provision in ordering a new trial. (Schindler's Brief at 3-5). Rule 61 dictates 
that Schindler must demonstrate that there was not only error by the trial court but that the 
error was "substantial" or "prejudicial." New trials are denied unless it is reasonably clear 
that prejudicial error tainted the proceedings or substantial justice was not achieved. Davis v. 
Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1995). 
Schindler failed to show any alleged error was substantial or prejudicial, warranting a 
new trial.8 Two district court judges found the facts and law warranted a jury determining 
whether Schindler was responsible for the injuries Florez received. Although Florez 
adamantly maintains no error occurred, any error would nonetheless, need to be deemed 
harmless. Morever, by examining each allegation of error, it is shown Schindler can't 
8Schindler also does not allege plain error. Any argument of plain error is waived. 
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establish error because of its failure to properly marshal the evidence under any of its four (4) 
arguments for obtaining a new trial: 
A. The BPPV Evidence Was Sufficient to Support the Verdict 
Schindler asserts there was insufficient evidence of Flore2' BPPV to support the 
verdict. Schindler lumps this argument with the court's review of Schindler's motion in 
limine to exclude Dr. Morgan. Schindler improperly piggybacks its arguments, i.e., if Dr. 
Morgan hadn't testified, there would be no BPPV causation evidence, hence the court should 
find there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. These arguments can not be 
intertwined. Since the trial court found Dr. Morgan competent to testify on causation, his 
opinion must be marshaled when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence submitted to the 
jury. As Schindler failed to properly marshal the evidence by excluding consideration of Dr. 
Morgan's opinion, Schindler's assertion that there was a lack of evidence to support the jury's 
verdict should fail. See Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425 (Utah 1998) (holding "the one 
challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict") Id at 433, citing McCorvey v. State Deft Of Tramp., 868 P.2d 41, 44 (Utah 1993). 
In making its determination, the jury heard Dr. Morgan's expert opinion that Flore2' 
BPPV was caused by the elevator incident; no medical expert contradicted this opinion. The 
jury was also provided Florez' extensive medical history, with the fierce cross-examination of 
Dr. Morgan and Dr. Siddoway based on this medical history. With Dr. Morgan's opinion on 
causation, and Dr. Siddoway's opinion and first hand explanation of Florez' prior 
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complaints of dizziness, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine Florez' BPPV 
was caused by the elevator incident. 
B. Evidence of Florez' Damages Was Sufficient to Support the Verdict 
In failing to marshal the evidence on damages, Schindler inaccurately 
represents Florez provided no evidence of damages. (Schindler's Brief at 43, ^ |2) Schindler 
ignores the testimony from the fact witnesses, three medical providers, Florez, and the 
multiple medical expense summaries. After the jury's determination of causation, Schindler's 
medical expense summaries, alone, were enough evidence to justify the amount of damages 
awarded by the jury. See Pettus v. Gottfried, 606 S.E. 2d 819 at 825 (Va. 2005) reinforcing, 
"[t]he general rule is that when a party unsuccessfully objects to evidence that he consider s 
improper but introduces on his own behalf evidence of the same character, he waives his 
objection to the other party's use of that evidence." Citing Combs v. Norfolk <& Western Ry. Co, 
507 S.E. 2d 355, 360 (Va. 1998), Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 413 S.E. 2d 875, 879 (1992), and 
Whitten v. McClelland, 120 S.E. 146, 150 (Va. 1923). 
Price-Orem v. Rollins, 784 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989), relied upon by Schindler, supports 
upholding the jury's verdict. In Price-Orem, the plaintiff had significantly less proof of 
damages than Florez and the jury verdict was upheld based on well established Utah 
precedent that the evidence of the amount of damages suffered involves a lower evidentiary 
standard than the evidence needed to establish there was a loss. Id. at 479. In Price-Orem, the 
plaintiff had no evidence of any "actual" losses, compared to Florez who demonstrated the 
amounts of her actual loses via multiple medical expense summaries. The Court indicated 
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that "the amount of damages may be based upon approximations, if the fact of damages is 
established, and the approximations are based upon reasonable assumptions or projections." 
Id. at 479. 
Florez presented actual expenses incurred; amounts that had been reviewed and were 
testified to be reasonable and customary charges within the community. Based on these 
actual damages incurred, coupled with the medical experts' testimony that the future damages 
would be consistent with the past few years of care, Florez' counsel properly argued 
approximate future damages. 
Schindler takes umbrage with Florez' reference to certain anti-inflammatory 
medications when approximating future damage. The need for anti-inflammatory 
medications was discussed during Dr. Amann's testimony. (R. 909 at 185) Schindler failed 
to object to counsel's reference to the wrong brand name of the anti-inflammatory during 
closing argument. (R. 911 at 662:10-23) Schindler cites no record for preserving this alleged 
error. (Schindler's Brief at 43 - 44). Accordingly, the objection is waived. 
The jury was fully aware counsel was making estimates on future medications and the 
jury's role was to make its own calculations, based on the evidence. (R. 911 at 665) The 
demonstrative calculations made by Florez' counsel during closing were not provided to the 
jury for their deliberations. The jury's independent determination of damages, without 
adopting the amount argued by Florez or Schindler in closing arguments, demonstrates there 
was no prejudice to Schindler. In making their independent determination, the jury was left 
with both parties' medical expense summaries and the medical testimony that the future costs 
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would be similar to the costs Florez incurred over the last few years. 
C. Based on Schindler's Defense That Flore2 Suffered BPPV Prior to the 
Elevator Incident, the Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury How to 
Allocate Damages if They Found Florez Had a Pre-Existing Condition 
Schindler asserts error for admission of jury instruction No. 28. (R. 0625) 
(Incorrectly referenced as R. 0628 in Schindler's Brief at 46). Whether a trial court properly 
instructed the jury is a question of law, which the appellate court will review for correctness. 
Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 109, \ 9; 992 P.2d 969; Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 
425, 429 (Utah 1998). 
Schindler suggests the trial court's instruction No. 28 was not a MUJI form 
instruction. (Schindler's Brief at 46, ^2) However, jury instruction No. 28 is an exact replica 
of MUJI 2nd CV2018. Schindler further asserts that Instruction No. 28 "misstates the law". 
In actuality, MUJI 2nd CV2018 is derived from Utah law housed in Robinson v. All-Star 
Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 109, \ 11, 992 P.2d 969 (Utah 1999), Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 689, 
U 14, 987 P.2d 588 (Utah 1999), and Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (Utah 
1966). Schindler fails to cite any legal authority which contradicts the above authority relied 
upon in creating the MUJI form instruction. 
Further, Schindler offered no alternative instruction on pre-existing conditions. 
"Under Utah law, objections must be raised with sufficient specificity at trial for the trial 
judge to have a legal basis for altering or rejecting the instruction . . . [the] objection must be 
sufficiently precise so as to alert the trial court to all claimed errors and to give the judge an 
opportunity to make corrections to the instructions before the jury retires." Jones v. Cyprus 
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Plateau Min. Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1997) (refusing to consider on appeal because the 
party neither requested an alternative instruction nor asked the court to reword its 
instruction). Schindler offers nothing in the record to demonstrate it accurately preserved its 
objection to the pre-existing instruction that would have allowed the trial court an 
opportunity for correction prior to the jury retiring for deliberations.9 
Where Schindler portrayed Florez's injuries as "pre-existing in nature" throughout the 
trial (R. 908 at 55:2-6; 58-63; 64:2-12; 690:13-14; 693:14-16; 700:12-14; 703:11-14), the trial 
court had the obligation to see that the jury was accurately instructed on the law. Kilpatrick v. 
Wiley, 2001 UT 107, \ 65, 37 P.3d 1130, citing Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 
1977). 
D. Schindler Waives Any Error Based on Improper Comments at Trial 
Schindler alleges Florez' counsel's comments warrant a new trial. At trial, Schindler 
objected to only two of the comments listed in Schindler's brief. Further, Schindler failed to 
ask for any curative instruction. As such, Schindler failed to preserve any allegations of 
improper conduct for appeal. "Absent an objection by [a] defendant, we will presume waiver 
of all arguments regarding the appropriateness of counsel's statements unless the error falls 
into the category of plain error." Noramandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc. 2007 UT App 382, ]^ 
30, 74 P.3d 1, citing Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992). See also West v. 
Johnson & Johnson Prod., Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), ( "[i]n absence of 
timely objection the offended party is deemed to have waived the claim of error through his 
9On appeal, Schindler also asserts that an instruction should have been given on the role of 
the treating physicians. (Schindler's Brief at 40-42) As Schindler did not request this 
instruction at trial, any alleged error would be waived. 
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participation in the atmosphere which produced the claim of prejudice." Id. at 861; holding 
no new trial warranted for counsel's reference to Johnson and Johnson as "old and big and 
very successful," description of defendant being dragged "kicking and screaming into the 
courthouse", counsel's attempt to testify himself and other comments of the same ilk); 
Hilliardv. A.H. Robins Co., 148 Cal. App.3d 374, 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (allegation of 
misconduct on appeal was waived because defendant failed to ask the court that the jury be 
admonished to ignore the statements or questions of lawyer's long litany of sustained 
objections, including, reference to death, inflammatory remarks about the subject of the 
lawsuit, berating witnesses and opposing counsel, violations of court orders, improper use of 
"do you know" questions); Sarko^y v. A.P. Green Industries, Inc., 2009 WL 2356676 *19 (N.J. 
Super A.D.) (although defendant's objections to fleeting comments were sustained, counsel 
failed to request a curative instruction depriving the trial court an opportunity to correct the 
situation and creating waiver of error on appeal.) 
a. Notwithstanding Schindler Failed to Object to Comments Cited in Schindler's Brief. 
Counsel's Comments Do Not Justify the Overturning of a Well Reasoned Jury 
Verdict 
As the trial court noted "this was a hard fought, hotly contested, jury trial. Emotions 
did run high." (R853, ^ j 2) Unfortunately, as such, there were instances wherein both lead 
counsel pushed the envelope on permissible commentary. Nonetheless, the commentary 
from counsel' did not rise to the level of legally requiring a new trial. See Hilliard v. A.H. 
Robins Co., 148 Cal. App.3d 374, 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("The factual issues were complex 
and emotional. It was inevitable that the lawyers, swept up in subjective feelings for their 
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respective clients, in a few instances, might have over stepped the permissible line of proper 
lawyering conduct. The able trial judge . . . did not permit the trial to degenerate into a free-
for-all. . . . there was substantial evidence presented to the jury to support the verdict. . . 
There was no miscarriage of justice;") 
Schindler relies on one Utah case to assert counsel's remarks established an improper 
appealing "to the social or economic prejudices of the jury," Donohue v. IHQ Inc. 748 P.2d 
1067 (Utah 1987).10 In Donohue, the Utah Supreme Court did nothold a particular comment 
"improper", as asserted by Schindler. (Schindler's Brief at 47). There were multiple 
comments reviewed and the Supreme Court made no determination of the appropriateness 
of any specific comment. Rather, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's discretion in 
allowing a new trial by stating, u[w]e are able to assess only the words as they appear in the 
records. The trial judge, on the other hand, was able to note other relevant factors 
such as counsel's gestures, inflection and expressions, as well as the jury's reaction... 
10Schindler strings together counsel's comments in a different order than they were presented 
to create an illusion. Despite Schindler's liberty with counsel's comments, it is important to 
note the few instances in which Schindler's size or corporate status was referenced during 
more than three hours of opening/closing argument and four days of trial. The first 
reference was merely an introduction of the defendant, coupled with the representation that 
Schindler builds, installs and maintains their own elevators and thus, there is no third party 
responsible. Schindler never objected to this introduction, preventing Florez or the court 
from realizing there was even a concern. 
The additional instance has been misrepresented by Schindler. Schindler misquotes the 
record. When counsel was responding to Schindler's unreasonable tactic of engaging in no 
discovery but spending a tremendous amount of money to fly Dr. Knoebel in to Utah to 
claim Connie is lying and then belittling every witness on the stand as dishonest, counsel 
questioned the fairness of these dictatorial tactics by "a person" and then threw in "or a 
corporation". Schindler represents that counsel stated it is unjust for "a person of a 
corporation" to proceed in this manner. This misrepresentation implies Schindler was being 
referred to for it's size rather than the questionableness of its overbearing and condescending 
tactics at trial. 
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Trial courts are in a much better position than are appellate courts to assess the 
overall effect of attorney misconduct at trial." Id. at 1068. (Emphasis added.) 
Here, similarly, the trial court's advantageous position in witnessing the entire trial 
rather than brief excerpts taken out of context, should be given deference. The trial court 
admittedly did not condone some of the comments, but held that "taken as a whole and in 
context, [counsel's] comments did not rise to the level of invoking the passion and prejudice 
of the jury." [R. 0853,1J2) 
Utah law allows "counsel wide latitude in closing arguments" and holds that 
"effective argument may employ various forensic skills designed to persuade a jury to view 
the evidence with a particular perspective." Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 112 (Utah 1982) 
Yet, for the closing argument to warrant a new trial it would have to go so far as to "affect 
the fundamental fairness of the trial" and the offended party must show that "a different 
result would have occurred". Id. at 112. In this case, there is no evidence that counsel's 
comments in any way affected the fundamental fairness of the trial and the jury verdict. 
Still, Florez responds to the two comments objected to at trial: 
1. Comments on Schindler's Admission of Negligence 
Schindler asserts Florez' counsel discussed Schindler's admitted negligence "contrary 
to the court's ruling that it should not be discussed before the jury and the parties' stipulation 
of negligence". (Schindler's Brief at 24) This is inaccurate. There was no pre-trial ruling that 
prohibited Flore2 from discussing Schindler's admission of liability with the jury and there 
was no concrete stipulation on this issue. Flore2 fought Schindler for several years on 
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liability, without any concession from Schindler. Two weeks before trial Schindler submitted 
a pre-trial ordering indicating there was a stipulation on liability. (R. 0657, No. 3) Florez 
submitted a pre-trial order that included no such stipulation. (R. 0669-70) The trial court 
signed neither party's proposed order prior to trial. (R. 0657) 
Regardless of the facts surrounding Schindler's admission, Schindler fails to explain 
how counsel's minor reference to Schindler's admission of liability prejudiced Schindler to 
the point of requiring a new trial. The minor comments made during the first five minutes 
of opening statements had no bearing on the ultimate determination of whether or not the 
medical evidence demonstrated Florez was injured. 
2. Counsel's Statement That He Knew His Client 
In four days of trial and in the two hours of closing arguments, Florez' counsel, 
admittedly, made an inappropriate comment. Florez' counsel unintentionally stated "I know 
Connie" during an off-the-cuff apology. This statement was made during rebuttal, it was not 
planned and counsel was not offering testimony. Still, after reviewing how this comment 
could be interpreted as vouching for his client, counsel regrets the comment. 
Notwithstanding any regret, the key is whether counsel's statement warrants a new trial. 
First and foremost, the statement must be put into accurate context. Florez' counsel 
was reviewing the multiple allegations levied against his client by Schindler during his closing 
arguments. Florez' counsel was questioning Schindler's surprising accusation in closing that, 
for years, Florez had been going to doctors and taking medications for a heart condition that 
was not real, i.e. it was invented to gain sympathy from people. (R. 911 at 680:2 -684:10) 
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When Florez' counsel realized the volume of his voice had risen, he took a deep breath and 
stated, "Pm sorry for getting upset, but I can only take so much of this - I know Connie - he 
doesn't.55 (R. 910 at 716:3-21) 
Contrary to Schindler's allegations of repeated, direct, vouching for the veracity of his 
client, at no time did counsel state that he had personal knowledge that Connie was a truthful 
person. It was the witnesses who testified Florez was truthful. (R. 908 at 81:25 - 82:2;R. 908 
at 101:10-12;R. 908 at 117:7-118:1) In actuality, counsel's statement made within an apology 
illustrates counsel was not intending to testify at all. Counsel was merely attempting to 
explain his angry demeanor by suggesting that when you work for an individual for four 
years you develop a personal relationship which lends to heightened reaction to personal 
attacks versus someone who has no personal relationship with the individual - its easier for 
them to assert personal attacks. 
Second, even assuming counsel's apology was interpreted as "vouching for his client's 
credibility'5, the comment does not warrant a new trial. In, herma v. Walmart^ 148 P.3d 880 
(OK 2006), the Oklahoma Supreme Court looked at the same assertion being made by 
Schindler in this case, i.e. that counsel improperly vouched for his client's credibility. The 
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial of a new trial by holding: 
"It is improper for counsel to vouch for the credibility of witnesses. Improper 
remarks used by counsel in argument, however, are not grounds for reversal 
where the language was provoked by remarks of counsel for the adverse party, 
unless it appears quite plainly that the verdict was influenced thereby. The rule 
applies even though the language used would otherwise warrant a reversal in 
the absence of such provocation." Id, at 885 citations omitted. 
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While the parties may debate the meaning of Florez' counsel's statement when he 
stated that he "knew Connie", it is undisputable that the statement was made in direct 
response to provocation by Schindler's counsel. The statement in question was made in 
rebuttal, while responding to Schindler's specific accusation that Florez had deceitfully created 
a non-exist heart condition. 
Schindler is unable to demonstrate that counsel's comments influenced the jury to the 
extent that a different result would have occurred. See Jones v. Carve/I, 641 P.2d 105,112 (Utah 
1982); Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W. 2d 108, 116-117 (Iowa. 1986) (Before granting a new trial 
for misconduct in arguments it must appear a different result would have been probable, but 
for the misconduct.) 
As observed by the trial court, the jury presented a verdict that was "well thought out, 
rational, and not the result of passion or prejudice. It was not a 'runaway' jury. It was not an 
excessive verdict. The verdict was well within the discretion and prerogative of the jury". 
(R. 0853) The trial court's first hand perspective of counsels' comments, the evidence, and 
the jury verdict, should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Schindler gave up on liability, conducted cursory discovery, relied upon internet 
articles as authoritative medical evidence, failed to hire their own expert regarding causation 
of BPPV, presented a single witness in opposition to Florez case at trial, and, ultimately, 
relied on a defense which personally attacked the credibility and veracity of Florez, the 
witnesses and opposing counsel. Schindler now asks this Court not merely for a second 
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chance, but to overturn the trial court's denial of summary judgment and dismiss Flore2' 
claim. Two different trial court judges and a jury found Schindler's arguments lacked 
persuasive value. This Court should be equally unpersuaded by the arguments raised on 
appeal. Schindler's requests on appeal should be denied in their entirety. 
DATED this />' day of January, 2010. 
/XIMDY VANDYKE / 
^-Attorney for Appellee 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment 
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is 
sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for 
all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the 
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying 
the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is 
not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so 
specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported 
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot 
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application 
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely 
for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending 
party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of 
the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a 
jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by 
which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or 
special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as 
a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall 
be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. 
The opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits The time within which the 
affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by 
the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new trial 
for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds 
therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days 
after entry of the judgment. 
Rule 6 1 . Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything 
done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment 
or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of 
the parties. 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for expert testimony if the scientific, 
technical, or other principles or methods underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) 
are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case. 
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the principles or methods on which such knowledge is 
based, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally 
accepted by the relevant expert community. 
Advisory Committee Note. 
Apart from its introductory clause, part (a) of the amended Rule recites verbatim Federal Rule 702 as it appeared before it 
was amended in 2000 to respond to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The 2007 
amendment to the Rule added that introductory clause, along with parts (b) and (c). Unlike its predecessor, the amended 
rule does not incorporate the text of the Federal Rule. Although Utah law foreshadowed in many respects the developments 
in federal law that commenced with Daubert, the 2007 amendment preserves and clarifies differences between the Utah and 
federal approaches to expert testimony. 
The amended rule embodies several general considerations. First, the rule is intended to be applied to all expert testimony. 
In this respect, the rule follows federal law as announced in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Next, like 
its federal counterpart, Utah's rule assigns to trial judges a "gatekeeper" responsibility to screen out unreliable expert 
testimony. In performing their gatekeeper function, trial judges should confront proposed expert testimony with rational 
skepticism. This degree of scrutiny is not so rigorous as to be satisfied only by scientific or other specialized principles or 
methods that are free of controversy or that meet any fixed set of criteria fashioned to test reliability. The rational skeptic is 
receptive to any plausible evidence that may bear on reliability. She is mindful that several principles, methods or 
techniques may be suitably reliable to merit admission into evidence for consideration by the trier of fact. The fields of 
knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the "scientific" and "technical", but extend to all "specialized" 
knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, 
training or education". Finally, the gatekeeping trial judge must take care to direct her skepticism to the particular 
proposition that the expert testimony is offered to support. The Daubert court characterized this task as focusing on the 
"work at hand". The practitioner should equally take care that the proffered expert testimony reliably addresses the "work at 
hand", and that the foundation of reliability presented for it reflects that consideration. 
Section (c) retains limited features of the traditional Frye test for expert testimony. Generally accepted principles and 
methods may be admitted based on judicial notice. The nature of the "work at hand" is especially important here. It might 
be important in some cases for an expert to educate the factfinder about general principles, without attempting to apply 
these principles to the specific facts of the case. The rule recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or 
exposition of principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts. Proposed expert testimony 
that seeks to set out relevant principles, methods or techniques without offering an opinion about how they should be 
applied to a particular array of facts will be, in most instances, more eligible for admission under section (c) than case 
specific opinion testimony. There are, however, scientific or specialized methods or techniques applied at a level of 
considerable operational detail that have acquired sufficient general acceptance to merit admission under section (c). 
The concept of general acceptance as used in section (c) is intended to replace the novel vs. non-novel dichotomy that has 
served as a central analytical tool in Utah's Rule 702 jurisprudence. The failure to show general acceptance meriting 
admission under section (c) does not mean the evidence is inadmissible, only that the threshold showing for reliability under 
section (b) must be shown by other means. 
Section (b) adopts the three general categories of inquiry for expert testimony contained in the federal rule. Unlike the 
federal rule, however, the Utah rule notes that the proponent of the testimony is required to make only a "threshold" 
showing. That "threshold" requires only a basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability for the testimony to be 
admissible, not that the opinion is indisputably correct. When a trial court, applying this amendment, rules that an expert's 
testimony is reliable, this does not necessarily mean that contradictory expert testimony is unreliable. The amendment is 
broad enough to permit testimony that is the product of competing principles or methods in the same field of expertise. 
Contrary and inconsistent opinions may simultaneously meet the threshold; it is for the factfinder to reconcile - or choose 
between - the different opinions. As such, this amendment is not intended to provide an excuse for an automatic challenge 
to the testimony of every expert, and it is not contemplated that evidentiary hearings will be routinely required in order for 
the trial judge to fulfill his role as a rationally skeptical gatekeeper. In the typical case, admissibility under the rule may be 
determined based on affidavits, expert reports prepared pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 26, deposition testimony and memoranda 
of counsel. 
Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts. 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be 
those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or 
data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion 
or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the 
expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. 
Advisory Committee Note - This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. The 2009 amendment adopts 
changes made to Federal Rule of Evidence 703 effective December 1, 2000. 
Rule 705. Disclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinion. 
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying 
facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts 
or data on cross-examination. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. The substance of this rule was formerly found in Rules 57 and 58, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971). The requirement that an expert disclose the underlying facts or data for his opinion when cross-examined 
was formerly found in Rule 58, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The discretion vested in the trial judge to require prior 
disclosure of underlying facts or data should be liberally exercised in situations where there has not been adequate discovery 
in civil cases or disclosure in criminal cases. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
AGGRAVATION OF SYMPTOMATIC PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS. 
A person who has a [physical, emotional, or mental] condition before the time of 
[describe event] is not entitled to recover damages for that condition or disability. 
However, the injured person is entitled to recover damages for any aggravation of the 
pre-existing condition that was cause by [name of defendant's fault, even if the 
person's pre-existing condition made [him] more vulnerable to physical [or emotional] 
harm than the average person. This is true even if another person may not have 
suffered any harm form the event at all. 
When a pre-existing condition makes the damages from injuries greater than 
they would have been without the condition, it is your duty to try to determine what 
portion of the [specific harm] to [name of plaintiff] was caused by the pre-existing 
condition and what portion was caused by the [describe event]. 
If you are not able to make such an apportionment, then you must conclude that 
the entire [specific harm] to [name plaintiff] was caused by [name of defendant's fault. 
References 
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Committee Notes 
This instruction is not intended to suggest that the verdict form include a line-item 
allocation of what part of the harm can be apportioned to the pre-existing condition, and 
what part to the defendant's fault. That question is answered by the jury's award of 
damages and should not be confused with allocation of comparative fault. 
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PROCEEDINGS 
DATE RECORDED: September 3, 2008 
DATE TRANSCRIBED: January 5, 2009 
TRANSCRIBED BY: Kelly L. Wi Iburn, CSR, RPR 
(September 3, 2008 - Florez v. Schindler) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: AI I right, that brings us to 
Florez and Schindler. 
AI I right. This is the time set for 
pretrial, but I see there are two issues floating 
around that we need to address. One has a notice to 
submit and the other one doesn't, but I noticed 
that -- we I I, let's start. 
The first one is a motion to exclude 
testimony, and then the second one is an objection 
that was fiIed in regards to pretr i a I d i scIosures, 
correct? 
MS. VANDYKE: Correct. 
SPEAKER #2: Correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: AI I right. So let's start first 
with the motion in limine. That's yours. 
SPEAKER #2: It is. I assume the Court's had 
an opportunity to read the papers --
THE COURT: I have. 
SPEAKER #2: -- so I'm not gonna rehash this 
thing ad nauseam. This motion goes to the testimony 
of Dr. Brian Morgan, who's a doctor who's been 
retained as an expert by Ms. Florez to testify both 
with regard to a diagnosis of vertigo, and to testify 
that that vertigo was caused by an incident on 
2 
Kelly L. Wi Iburn, CSR, RPR 
DeoomaxMerit 
(September 3, 2008 - Florez v. Schindler) 
June 15, 2004, when she was trapped in an elevator. 
Under the standard of Ramash (phonetic), your 
Honor, which I'm sure the Court's famiIiar with, in 
order for a expert to testify they have to meet some 
qua I ifications. In addition to being of assistance to 
the trier of fact they have to testify with regard to 
scientific principles that are inherently reliable. 
They have to have properly appl ied those, and 
be a person qua I ified to do that. And the testimony 
has to be founded on that work. And finally, the 
testimony that's proffered must be more probative than 
prejudicial . 
Dr. Morgan is a sports medicine doctor. He 
has no training in entolaryngol -- boy, I have a tough 
time with that one. Entolaryngology -- yeah, that's 
it -- neurology, or anything associated with the 
condition of vertigo, which is a condition of the 
inner ear. 
He testified in his deposition that what he 
did is he read through these medical records and he 
adopted a diagnosis that had been made by a 
Dr. Siddoway. Dr. Siddoway is a qualified doctor in 
this area. 
The problem that you run into is that the 
person who's testifying isn't qualified. And the 
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DeDomaxMerit 
(September 3, 2008 - Florez v. Schindler) 
1 person who is qua I ified can't testify as an expert 
2 because he's a treat i ng phys i c i an who has not been 
3 designated as an expert and has not submitted an 
4 expert report under Rule 26(a)(3.) 
5 So what they're trying to do is get testimony 
6 in through an unqual ified witness that cannot come in 
7 through what would have been a qua I ified witness had 
8 they compl ied with the rules with regard to experts. 
9 Finally, your Honor, I think having 
10 Dr. Morgan, as a medical doctor, testify to the jury 
11 that this, that this is the diagnosis of this 
12 Plaintiff when in fact he has no qua I ifications to do 
13 so -- a I I he's do i ng, he's read i ng a, a document. And 
14 he's say i ng, Th i s document says th i s. 
15 Now, that gives undue weight to that piece of 
16 paper because it's being parroted by a guy the jury is 
17 Iook i ng at and say i ng, We I I, he's a med i caI doctor. 
18 Not necessari ly understanding the difference between a 
19 med i caI doctor who's a sports med i c i ne doc and a 
20 medical doctor who is a neurologist. 
21 So I think that there are problems with 
22 regard to Dr. Morgan on that front. Dr. Morgan 
23 also -- although it doesn't appear in his expert 
24 report -- in his deposition testified that this 
25 vertigo condition was caused by this incident on 
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DepomaxMerit 
(September 3, 2008 - Florez v. Schindler) 
June 15, 2004. 
And he testified that he reached that 
conclusion as to causation because he looked at the 
medical records after that incident on that date and 
he said she now had been diagnosed with vertigo. And 
he said the records he saw prior to that date did not 
show any condition of vertigo; therefore, this, this 
incident was the cause of the vertigo. 
Wei I, your Honor, first of a I I it's not 
scientific testimony. There -- it doesn't meet the 
Ramash standards. He didn't apply any scientific 
principles whatsoever. He read documents and said, 
This is what I saw here and this is what I saw here. 
But he's also wrong, because there is a 
specific document -- and we attached it as Exhibit H 
to our memorandum -- where Dr. Siddoway diagnosed this 
patient as having vertigo and treated her for vertigo 
two years prior. 
Beyond that, Dr. Morgan has submitted no 
testimony whatsoever with regard to any other injury 
caused by this incident. The only thing he testified 
to was that this vertigo condition was caused by this 
i nc i dent. 
They are trying to claim damages for rib 
injury, back injury, various other injuries. There's 
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absolutely no testimony, no expert, nothing to 
estabi ish any causation with regard to anything other 
than vertigo. 
And as I point out, the vertigo testimony is 
highly suspect, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
SPEAKER #2: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Response? Who's up? 
MS. VANDYKE: Defendant raises the Ramash 
step -- standard today to the Court, but interestingly 
the Court wi I I note that was not raised in their 
initial motion so we didn't have an opportunity. That 
was later addressed in the reply. 
What we did do in the opposition, that I 
would direct the Court's attention to, is address the 
standard under Rule 703. Which of course has 
superseded or encompassed Ramash standard, the more 
recent rule. And how -- and we did, in our 
opposition, lay out how we had met those Rule 703 
standards. 
The mot i on fiIed by Defendant or i g i naI Iy 
discussed this issue of can Dr. Morgan testify 
against -- or testify in a specialty and rely -- that 
he is not -- he's relying on a diagnosis of a doctor 
in another specialty. There you go. 
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And as we pointed out in our opposition, this 
is a generally accepted practice. There's been no 
evidence introduced by Defendant or anyone that this 
isn't commonly done. And in fact even Defendant 
admits that this is Dr. Morgan's specialty. 
His specia Ity is actuaI Iy evaIuati ng, taki ng 
records from other doctors, and determining these 
types of i ssues. You take a spec i a Ii st, he, he -- his 
total specialty is rehabilitation. You take somebody 
who's injured, you evaluate the multiple areas of 
injury, and you do have to refer them out to other 
subspecialties for treatment. 
However, he commonly -- and it's generally 
accepted i n the commun i ty -- re Ii es upon the treat i ng 
physician for the particular diagnosis. And that's 
what he d i d here. He re Ii ed upon the d i agnos i s of 
Dr. Siddoway, and then used his special expertise in 
the area of trauma and rehabiI itat ion. Which is what 
kind of causes -- what kind of areas cause vertigo. 
And he determined that a trauma to the 
head -- which is what was sustained by the Plaintiff 
in this case -- can be a cause of this vertigo. And 
then looking upon the past history and he makes the 
determination that this was the precipitating factor 
that caused the vertigo. 
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They reference one medical record where she'd 
experienced vertigo in the past. There is no 
diagnosis by any doctor of the vertigo in the past. 
There's no affidavit produced by any doctor suggesting 
that she had a positional vertigo or diagnosis in the 
past. 
There was one medical record over a 50-year 
history where she checked symptomology positive for 
being dizzy. That does not equate to positional 
vertigo. What that goes to is the weight of 
Dr. Morgan's testimony. 
Defendant i s a 11 owed then to get up and 
question, Did you see this record on this date where 
she complained of vertigo? Yes, I did. That type of 
s i tuat i on. But that does not excIude adm i ss i b i Ii ty 
under Rule 703. 
Under Rule 703, as stated in the Plaintiff's 
oppos i t i on, Dr. Morgan has met a 11 of the 
requirements. He's using a gen -- generally accepted 
practice, applying it to specific facts of this case, 
and using his specialized knowledge and expertise in 
the area of rehabi Iitat ion to come to his conclusion. 
THE COURT: So is Dr. Morgan going to give me 
his or her own opinion, as opposed to just parroting 
Dr. Siddoway's? Your position is he's reviewed this 
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and his opinion is consistent with Dr. Siddoway's? 
MS. VANDYKE: Yes. Yes, but he's taking it a 
step further in the sense that he's relying upon the 
diagnosis in the subspecialty, but in terms of 
causation Dr. Morgan is the one with experience in 
trauma, can this condition be caused by a trauma to 
the head? 
And in his experience, with his 
rehab i I i tat i on of i nd i v i duaIs who've exper i enced 
physical trauma, yes, this is a condition that can be 
caused by trauma to head --to the head. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. VANDYKE: So --
THE COURT: But he didn't -- he did not -- is 
he accepting Dr. Siddoway's position in regards to 
what the diagnosis was as to vertigo? 
MS. VANDYKE: Yes. 
THE COURT: He did not make his own 
independent determination of vertigo? 
MS. VANDYKE: That is accurate, your Honor. 
There was --
THE COURT: But, but he's fi I I ing in the --
one chink of your case that says the vertigo could 
have been caused by a blunt to the --
MS. VANDYKE: Yes, trauma to the head. 
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THE COURT: Trauma to the head. Trauma. 
MS. VANDYKE: Yes. In fact, there was two 
doctors -- and that's a -- reaMy a dimension that's 
hard to pronounce, but it's a really -- it's a 
subspecialty area. And there's different tests you 
do, and they're extensive, and they're expensive 
tests. 
So Dr. Morgan, no, did not repeat those 
tests. He's replying -- relying on the evaluation of 
actuaI Iy both S i ddoway and then there's a Dr. She I ton, 
at the University of Utah, who also did some tests and 
confirmed that diagnosis. 
THE COURT: So I suspect that Dr. Morgan 
could have disagreed and said that this couldn't have 
happened in that way? 
MS. VANDYKE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. VANDYKE: Absolutely. And then the last 
argument that was also raised in the reply -- that we 
haven't had an opportunity to respond to -- is somehow 
that he can't rely on Dr. Siddoway because 
Dr. Siddoway was a treating physician. He didn't 
provide an expert report. 
L i ke I sa i d, th i s has j ust been ra i sed i n the 
reply memorandum. We've not opportunity -- there's 
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never been an objection fi led to us that somehow 
Dr. Siddoway needed to provide an expert report. We'd 
be happy to address them on a separate motion if 
that's an issue. 
But in this case I don't think it is because, 
as I mentioned, under Rule 703 it is a standard and 
generally accepted practice for one doctor to rely on 
the diagnosis of another doctor in offering his 
op i n i on. 
And I know of no requirement that relying 
upon the other doctor, that doctor had to produce an 
expert report in order to rely on his diagnosis and 
his treating records. 
THE COURT: Okay thank you. Response? 
SPEAKER #2: Yeah. Ramash is, is the law 
under (inaudible), as the Court knows. With regard to 
this, Counsel just said that Dr. Morgan was gonna 
testify that this condition was caused by a trauma to 
the head, and her past history, and the precipitating 
factors. 
And none of that's in his report, your Honor. 
And he didn't testify to any of that at his 
depos i t i on. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: (Inaudible.) 
SPEAKER #2: That's, that's, that's a 
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fabrication. His report has to contain his opinions. 
That is not in his report. And what he said at his 
deposition is -- when asked about this -- he said --
on questioning of: 
"Why did you use the word benign if 
there's no difference between benign 
positional vertigo and positional 
vertigo? It's your report, you used the 
word, I'd I i ke to know why you used the 
word. 
"If I can reference to No. 33 in the 
review of records, Dr. John Siddoway 
gave an impression: Symptoms quite 
typical of benign positional --
positional vertigo. 
"I fee I that she had ben i gn 
positional vertigo. I concur with his 
diagnosis. If there seems to be a 
problem with that, I would refer you to 
Dr. Siddoway." 
He never testified as to make -- reaching any 
opinion, through any testing, through any independent 
knowledge, through any study or research, that this 
pat i ent had th i s cond i t i on. He re Ii ed so IeIy on what 
Dr. Siddoway had told -- had stated in the medical 
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records. 
There's no expertise involved in that, your 
Honor. He has absolutely zero training to be, to be 
testifying as to this. 
THE COURT: Am I not gonna hear from 
Dr. Siddoway? Or the jury not gonna hear from 
Dr. Siddoway? 
MR. WARD: No, he's been subpoenaed, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WARD: But that's got nothing to do with 
what Dr. Morgan can testify to. 
THE COURT: Well, I, I --maybe I'm missing 
something, but I, I -- if Dr. Siddoway takes the stand 
and testifies that he did a diagnosis of vertigo. And 
then Dr. Morgan takes the stand and says, I re Iied 
upon Dr. Siddigo -- Dr. Siddoway's diagnosis of 
vertigo, and from that I conclude that this could have 
been caused by a blunt instrument. 
Then their testimony --or not a blunt 
instrument, head trauma. Then, then I don't see why 
that testimony's not admissible. You can always 
attack Dr. Siddoway for the prognosis or the diagnosis 
in the first place. You can always attack Dr. Morgan 
for relying upon it. 
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I understand that -- I thought maybe that 
your point was that the only one that was gonna 
testify was Dr. Morgan. And therefore they were gonna 
bootstrap Dr. Siddoway's opinion in with just using 
Dr. Morgan, who never did the analysis. 
But I understand Dr. Morgan's gonna testify 
that the vertigo could have been caused by the head 
trauma, and Dr. Siddoway is not going to testify to 
that. 
SPEAKER #2: We I I --
THE COURT: Now, you -- you're still -- as 
long as Dr. Siddoway testifies you can always attack 
his testimony. And you can always attack his 
diagnosis. And you can always say, A, he shouldn't 
have reached that conclusion, and B, Dr. Morgan 
shouIdn't have re Ii ed upon i t. 
But I thought you were clearly saying that 
they were just gonna call Dr. Morgan, and bootstrap 
Dr. Siddoway's testimony in and he was never going to 
appear. But it seems to me the doctors are testifying 
on two different issues, but they are entitled to rely 
upon each other's diagnosis. 
SPEAKER #2: Except that Dr. Siddoway wi 11 be 
giving an expert opinion and has not been designated 
as an expert in this case. 
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THE COURT: But isn't it as to true --
SPEAKER #2: And under (inaudible) versus 
Youngblood, he's not entitled to do that. 
THE COURT: He's not entitled to, to give his 
opinion as to what his diagnosis and his treatment 
was? 
SPEAKER #2: No. He's entitled to testify as 
to the facts of his treatment. But he is not entitled 
to render any expert opinions with regard to 
causation, or treatment, or anything else. 
THE COURT: Well, but I didn't understand him 
to do so. I thought he was only going to testify that 
she had vertigo, and that Dr. Morgan is being used to 
testify as to what the cause was. Now, that's the way 
I understand the chain. And if that's the chain, then 
they're entitled to go that way. 
I would agree with you that, that 
Dr. Siddoway, as a treating physician, can't come in 
and say that the trauma caused the vertigo. But he 
can come in and say, I examined this patient, I looked 
at this patient, and I diagnosed her with vertigo. 
Then Dr. Morgan comes in and testifies and 
says, That vertigo could have been caused or was 
caused by the trauma blow to her head on such and such 
a day. I don't have a problem with that. 
15_ 
Kel ly L. WiIburn, CSR, RPR 
Honnmavl l i lc ir i t-
(September 3, 2008 - Florez v. Schindler) 
SPEAKER #2: Okay. 
THE COURT: I don't see that problem. 
SPEAKER #2: Two things. With regard to 
Dr. Siddoway. The minute he says, And I diagnosed 
her, he's giving an expert opinion. Under, under the 
Pete versus Youngblood case that is not admissible as 
expert testimony because they have not provided an 
expert report with regard to that. 
THE COURT: No, I, I, I disagree with that 
one, Counsel. 
SPEAKER #2: Okay. 
THE COURT: I think that's what treating 
physicians do. They're entitled to make a diagnosis. 
That -- the opinion that she has vertigo would be 
within his realm, as a treating physician, to make 
that diagnosis. 
I've a I ways v i ewed expert test i mony i n the 
sense of now taking that and putting it somewhere in 
regards to causation or some of the old terms that we 
used to have. 1,1 understand they gotta br i ng i n an 
expert to do that. 
But clearly the diagnosis and the treatment 
would be within that physician. If I fall out of a 
tree and break my leg, my treating physician is, is 
fair to say, He broke his leg. That was a broken leg. 
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It was consistent with my experience as a doctor and 
my expertise as a doctor, and I treated him as such. 
Now, he may not be able to say that the cause 
of that broken I eg was because Judge West fe11 out of 
a tree or was pushed by a tree. That's gonna require 
someone else to come in and show the causation. But 
clearly my treating physician can tell me, It's a 
broken leg, and I treated it as a broken leg. 
And he's giving an expert opinion, because 
you or Mr. Ward couldn't look at my leg and say, 
That's a broken I eg. We I I, maybe you couId. But, I 
mean, you wouldn't be recognized as experts because 
you guys are bri11iant lawyers, you're not bri11iant 
phys i c i ans. 
So I, I, I see the distinction there. I 
think treating physicians can give opinions, even 
expert opinions, within their expertise. But I don't 
really think they're entitled to extrapolate it out 
I ike other experts are required to do. 
SPEAKER #2: Okay. The next problem is this. 
Once you get that d i agnos i s you say, We 11, he can come 
in and testify that a blow to the head can cause that. 
It's not in his report, okay? He didn't say --
THE COURT: In Dr. Morgan's or Dr. Siddoway? 
SPEAKER #2: Not in Dr. Morgan's report. 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
SPEAKER #2: He didn't say, This was caused 
by a blow to the head that happened in connection with 
this incident. When he was asked in his deposition, 
this is what he said: 
"So j ust to cIar i fy, because you 
didn't see anything -- any prior history 
of dizziness, you concluded, based on 
this accident, that the accident must 
have been cause -- must have caused the 
vertigo; is that correct? 
"That was my causation, correct." 
That's it. That's all he said. Now, they've 
done a good job doing their research since then. And 
now they're gonna have him come in and testify 
something that's not in his report, didn't testify to 
it, and it's not admissible. 
His opinions have to be in his report or they 
are not admissible in this court, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Ms. Vandyke, do you have a response to that? 
MR. WARD: Just want to (inaudible) --
THE COURT: Or Mr. Ward? 
MR. WARD: -- your Honor, because I was at 
that depo that he's quoting. 
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SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, I'd prefer that we 
have one lawyer argue the matter. 
MR. WARD: Wei I, do you want to hear what 
happened at the depo? Because he only read part of 
it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
SPEAKER #2: I — 
MR. WARD: What happened was --
SPEAKER #2: I read the entire thing, your 
Honor. 
MR. WARD: What happened was, when -- what he 
said -- the gentleman taking the depo wasn't 
Mr. (InaudibIe), it was his associate. And I was 
there. 
And the associate came back and said, you 
know, Are you sure you're gonna say this thing felI 
(inaudible)? Because she fell and hit her head kind 
of thing. 
And he said to him, Look, you've been trying 
now for a long time to get me to say it's something 
bes i des th i s fa I I, and I'm not gonna say that. It's 
the f a I I. 
At that point, the deposition was disbanded. 
He went and ca11ed Mr. (InaudibIe.) Came back in and 
said, We don't want to talk to you anymore, and they 
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walked out. 
So I don't even know if that got on the 
record, but that's what happened. He kept going at 
him, trying to get him to say anything but the falI 
caused this. 
And the doctor kept saying, No, I think it's 
the falI. Finally the doctor got frustrated and said 
that to h i m and they ca11ed the depo. 
THE COURT: Why does the report --
MS. VANDYKE: Your Honor --
THE COURT: What, what --he raised some good 
po i nts, Iet me fo11ow up on them. What does the 
report say that was submitted? 
MR. WARD: (Inaudible.) 
MS. VANDYKE: I'll respond. That's just 
about the depo. 
Your Honor, Dr. Morgan was asked to evaluate 
was there any injuries as a result of this incident. 
As your Honor is probably aware, frequently doctors 
will come back and say, No, there wasn't. I don't 
be Iieve there was injuries. Other words there was no 
causat i on. 
What he determined as his conclusion was 
there was a four percent impairment, meaning as a 
result of the vertigo. And he actually didn't find an 
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impairment for the rib injury because there is none 
under the AMA guide I ines. 
But he d i d say under the AMA gu i deIi nes she 
has a four percent permanent impairment as result of 
this incident. Like I said, I've seen many reports 
where they come back and say, No, there was no 
injuries, there's no causation, there is a 
zero percent impairment. 
So he's wanting him -- he's now taking it to 
a higher standard. Wanting him to say, The four 
percent permanent i mpa i rment as a resu11 of the 
incident means I think that the vertigo was a cause of 
the elevator accident. 
We 11, the quest i on posed to h i m i n a Ietter 
form was, Do you think she was injured as a result of 
this? If so, what injuries did he (sic) suffer? 
So the response is, As a result of the 
incer -- the incident, she suffered a four percent 
i mpa i rment. 
So it is in the report because that's his 
conclusion. Four percent permanent impo -- impairment 
because of the vertigo because of the elevator 
incident. It is in his report. 
THE COURT: Are you extrapolating that from 
the report, or is that clear? 
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MS. VANDYKE: It's very clear. Like I 
said 
SPEAKER #2: (Inaudible.) 
MS. VANDYKE: -- I've gotten reports, and so 
has he. In fact their doctor, their doctor came back 
and said --
THE COURT: Do I have a copy of the report? 
I don't, I don't --
SPEAKER #2: You do, your Honor. 
MS. VANDYKE: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: I don't remember reading that. 
SPEAKER #2: Yeah, it's attached as Exhibit D 
to our memorandum. 
MS. VANDYKE: And their doctor came back and 
d i d just the oppos i te. Sa i d, I th i nk there's a 
zero percent impairment. I don't think she was hurt. 
I don't think the vertigo was caused by the elevator. 
And Dr. Morgan sa i d, I do be Ii eve i t was 
caused by the elevator incident, and so I'm awarding 
her a four percent impairment. 
SPEAKER #2: And if you'I I read the 
conclusion that isn't there, your Honor. 
MS. VANDYKE: And I actually do have the 
deposition confirming what Mr. Ward said in terms of 
the testimony. Taking a break and coming back and 
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telling him, I have no further questions. 
But he was never, ever asked about -- when he 
said, They've done their homework, I mean, it's 
ridiculous to suggest that the attorneys have created 
causat i on. He, he's a med i caI profess i onaI. He 
testified on causation. 
We didn't come back and do research and 
change his opinion or offer him an opinion. There was 
about a 15-minute deposition, I believe. I'd have to 
check the numbers. But it was really short, and they 
walked out. 
And that's not doctor -- it doesn't go to the 
deficit of Dr. Morgan. 
THE COURT: Okay. Response? 
SPEAKER #2: We 11, I th i nk you can read the 
report, your Honor. It's not --
THE COURT: I found it. 
SPEAKER #2: And you can also read the 
deposition, because we've attached it. And what this 
doctor said is the basis on which he determined that 
this, this injury arose from and was caused by this 
incident was, I felt -- and this is out of his depo: 
"I fe11 that without any prior 
history of dizziness, and reviewing the 
records, that it was, that it was --
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that was causation related to the 
eIevator ace i dent." 
Okay? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative.) 
SPEAKER #2: That's the basis on which he 
reached his conclusion. That's it. And it was 
repeated back to him, just to clarify, that: 
"Because you didn't see any 
existing -- any prior history of 
dizziness you concluded, based on this 
accident, that the accident must have 
been caused by vertigo; is that correct? 
"That was my causation, correct." 
That's what he's saying. I saw it in the 
records after, I didn't see it in the records before. 
He didn't say anything about trauma to the head. He 
didn't say about -- anything about doing any testing. 
He didn't say anything about anything. That's what he 
said, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. No, I, I think the 
report's clear enough. I'm looking at page 6, 
one -- we 11, that first one is a half a paragraph. 
One, two, third, third paragraph, or the second full 
one: 
"It is apparent that at the current 
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time the patient continues to have 
symptoms since the time of the injury, 
although in the medical red -- record it 
states from the vestibular rehab notes 
that the patient was having no symptoms 
at that time. 
"With the somewhat inconsistencies 
of current systems versus resolution of 
symptoms, I feel that the patient most 
appropriately fits into the four percent 
i mpa i rment of the who Ie person, as 
out Ii ned i n ExampIe 35 on 312 of the 
Guides to Evaluation of Permanent 
Impa i rment. 
"This clearly fits into Class 1 
classification between 0 and 14 percent 
of the who Ie person." 
Then he goes on to talk about the impairment 
rating. He then goes on to talk about the fact in 
paragraph 3, No. 3: 
"It i s my med i caI op i n i on that the 
pat i ent will need further med i caI 
attention regarding her dizziness and 
ben i gn pos i t i onaI vert i go." 
And he goes on, and on, and on and talks 
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about that. I think a fair reading of the doctor's 
report is that he's of the opinion that the accident 
was the cause of her vertigo, and at least enough to 
go to the jury. 
They may not agree with me. They may agree 
with you, they may not agree with Mr. Ward. But I 
think it's their determination to make that issue. 
SPEAKER #2: Okay. Your Honor, I'd just like 
to point out that in deposition, when asked how he 
wrote that -- how he arrived at that determination of 
causat i on a 11 he sa i d was, I Iooked at the med i caI 
records. That's it. That is not an expert opinion, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: We I I, that's gonna be the burden 
on Mr. Ward and Ms. Vandyke to come in and show that 
that is his level of expertise. That he's the type of 
expert that can take the opinions of a I I the other 
doctors, analyze them, review them, and say, I think 
this was, in fact, the cause. 
I do th i s a I I the t i me w i th ace i dent 
reconstructionists who were never at the accident. 
They never see it. They come in, they say, Officer A 
testified to this, Officer B talked to this, C did 
th i s. 
This witness said this, this witness said 
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this. And as a resuIt of all these things I put them 
together, and it is my considered opinion that X 
fai led to yield the right-of-way and that was the 
cause of this accident. 
I don't see that analogy being any different 
in this situation, if Mr. Ward and Ms. Vandyke can 
make their proof. 
MR. WARD: Your Honor, I just want to point 
out so that you understand what happened at the depo. 
On the last page of the depo Dr. Morgan says on 
line 20, page 17 -- (inaudible) very shortly -- he 
says: 
"You asked me for causation, I gave 
you causation" -- this is Dr. Morgan --
"the elevator accident. What else do 
you want to ask me? 
"Wei I, I just have a few more 
quest i ons. 
"Okay." 
And then he goes through a bunch of things. 
Is what he's saying is, What if I had a medical -- the 
question is saying, What if I had a medical record 
that said this? 
Doctor sa i d, We I I, show me the record. Then 
I -- maybe it would change my opinion. 
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We I I, I don't have i t. But what i f I had a 
record that said that? He did that few times. Then 
Dr. Morgan said: 
"You've asked the same question. 
The question is, unless I have medical 
records for my review I'm going to say 
that the elevator accident was the 
causat i on." 
Dr. Morgan said: "Unless you show 
me records that prove to me that I'm 
wrong, the elevator accident is the 
causat i on." 
And that's (inaudible) deposition 
(i naud i bIe.) 
THE COURT: At th i s po i nt I'm deny i ng the 
mot i on in, in Ii m i ne and we'11 proceed to, to tr i a I 
accordingly. 
What other issues do we have that we need to 
discuss before we get there, anything else? 
SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, I think, I think it 
would be worthwhi le to discuss the fact that there is 
no causation testimony with regard to any of these 
other injuries. I think that would simplify things. 
It's very clear from the report that the only 
i nj ury as to wh ich Dr. Morgan will test ify is vert igo. 
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THE COURT: Okay. Response? 
MS. VANDYKE: Your Honor, actuaMy she's 
making two claims: One's the vertigo, one the rib, 
which is also discussed in Dr. Morgan's -- he talks 
about i t, but he says she doesn't qua Ii fy under the 
AMA gu i deIi nes. 
So what he's saying is it's not a permanent 
impairment. I mean -- but he's not -- again, he's not 
suggesting -- I don't know what he wants. Again, he's 
suggesting a higher standard. 
THE COURT: Wait a sec --
SPEAKER #2: He didn't --
MS. VANDYKE: He finds the injuries are as a 
resu11 of that, but they don't qua Ii fy for a permanent 
i mpa i rment. 
SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, he --
MS. VANDYKE: That doesn't mean she doesn't 
have them. 
SPEAKER #2: He didn't testify that this 
was -- that the rib injury was caused by --
MS. VANDYKE: (Inaudible.) 
SPEAKER #2: -- the elevator. 
THE COURT: What does the specific --
MR. WARD: Doesn't matter, your Honor, 
Dr. Ammon (phonetic) is coming to testify about the 
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rib injury. He's the fellow who's been working on it. 
So it's the same situation --
SPEAKER #2: Yeah but he can't testify as to 
causation, your Honor. 
MR. WARD: He can testify --
SPEAKER #2: And neither, neither can 
Dr. Morgan if he hasn't --
MR. WARD: Morgan can tes --
SPEAKER #2: -- put it in his report. 
MR. WARD: Amnion's gonna testify what the 
diagnosis is, and Morgan can testify to causation. 
Just I ike with Siddoway. Ammon's the one who's been 
treating her, not Morgan. Ammon's the one who's been 
treating her for years (inaudible.) 
MS. VANDYKE: It — 
MR. WARD: (Inaudible.) 
MS. VANDYKE: Okay. Let me just, in the same 
page that your Honor cited earl ier as being definitive 
he d i scusses both the ri b and the cerv i caI pI i ne 
spine. And his conclusion is he doesn't say --
there's not enough evidence to support a permanent 
i mpa i rment. 
But the same thing is he goes through the, 
the process of where these incidents came from, this 
is where she's at, this is where she started, this is 
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where's she's resulting symptoms. Out of those 
symptoms, under the AMA gu i deI i nes, th i s much 
percentage is apportioned to that. 
He can st i11 taIk about was i t caused --
THE COURT: So is it your position that 
Dr. Morgan is going to address the issue of causation 
here? 
MS. VANDYKE: Yes. 
THE COURT: But he's going to say that it 
doesn't qua Iify for a permanent --
MS. VANDYKE: Yes. 
MR. WARD: Right. 
MS. VANDYKE: That's exactly what he's gonna 
say. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, it's not in his 
report. He found, he found no evidence of a rib 
injury whatsoever. 
MS. VANDYKE: That's, that's not true. He 
discusses it in detail and makes the conclusion though 
that because -- it's on that exact same page that the 
Court decided as being significant on vertigo: 
"I do not fee I the pat i ent has a 
permanent impairment of her ribs, as she 
is currently only reporting subjective 
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symptoms of pain. And without 
radiographic evidence of a rib fracture 
or rib abnormal -- normalies...." 
So he talks about the rib pain. But is that 
something she can still claim? Absolutely. Just 
because it's not an i mpa i rment under the gu i deI i ne 
does not disqualify her from making the a I legation 
regarding the injury. 
And aga i n, the treat i ng phys i c i an will 
testify about what that treatment has to undergo 
because of that. Dr. Morgan will test i fy where that 
came from. 
SPEAKER #2: And your Honor, there's nothing 
in that report where he says anything except that he 
can find no evidence of a rib injury. He never makes 
any statement that there's a rib injury caused by this 
i nc i dent. 
THE COURT: What is this language that she's 
reading? Why does he say: 
"I do not fee I the pat i ent has a 
permanent impairment of her ribs, as she 
is currently only reporting subjective 
symptoms of pain. Without radiographic 
evidence of a rib fracture or rib 
abnormalities I do not feel there is 
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justifiable evidence to support a 
permanent i mpa i rment." 
Doesn't that imply that --
SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, he's -- she's going 
in and saying, I've got a rib injury. And he said, I 
don't see anything that indicates this. He doesn't 
say anything about having any causal I ink to this 
i nc i dent. 
MR. WARD: Then he can attack Dr. Morgan's 
analysis. But that doesn't mean it precludes the 
test i mony. 
THE COURT: I think it goes to the weight. 
I, I --so far I'm, I'm convinced they can go ahead on 
the rib injury and they can go ahead on the vertigo. 
Is there anything else we can Iimit in this matter? 
SPEAKER #2: We'd I ike to --
MS. VANDYKE: (Inaudible) just the objection 
on the pretrial disclosures. 
SPEAKER #2: Yeah, we'd Ii ke to taIk about 
witnesses and. I mean, I think the problem with the 
pretrial disclosures is we did -- we, you know, put 
everyone in there because we didn't know if we were 
gonna be able to reach a stipulation on medical 
records. And we have, I be Ii eve. 
Is that right, Erik? 
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MR. WARD: I hope so . 
SPEAKER #2: Yeah. You sent me one, and. 
MR. WARD: But I haven't got it, so. 
SPEAKER #2: And I've got it, I've got it 
w i th me and we'11 s i gn that. 
THE COURT: So how much --
SPEAKER #2: So that eIi m i nates the med i caI 
providers. The other thing is, your Honor, we are 
w i11i ng to st i puI ate to negIi gence. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
SPEAKER #2: If that wi 11 el iminate from 
testimony our two employees that they have Iisted. 
Who are Vince Garcia and Tony Hal I. 
THE COURT: Okay. And are you wi I Iing to 
accept that stipulation? 
MR. WARD: Uh-huh (affirmative.) 
THE COURT: Well --
MS. VANDYKE: We are, your Honor, but the one 
thing is --
THE COURT: You're cond i t i onaI and he's yes. 
MS. VANDYKE: No. 
THE COURT: So I gotta admit, it's no fair to 
double tag team him. Do you two agree, or --
MS. VANDYKE: Wei I, I'm handling the 
objections of pretrial disclosures. 
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MR. WARD: Forgive me, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
SPEAKER #2: Yeah. 
MS. VANDYKE: So --
THE COURT: Yeah, I --
SPEAKER #2: So I think what that does --
MS. VANDYKE: The problem I have is, is we'I I 
go ahead -- the liability is not the issue. But 
eIi m i nat i ng -- I don't th i nk the med i caI records 
stipulation takes care of the fact that they named 60 
individuals as the documents. I think -- as their 
disclosure of documents. 
We st i 11 need a pre -- a new pretr i a I 
disclosures from the Defendant. There is absolutely 
no way that we can prepare for trial based on the 
information they've provided to us. 
THE COURT: Okay. But, but he's asked today 
if you -- you've reached a stipulation in regards to 
the med i caI records. He's asked you today i f you'I I 
accept the st i puI at i on on the i ssue of negIi gence, 
because that gets through with two more witnesses. 
How can he prepare a new order unti I he finds 
out what you are going to agree to or not agree to as 
of today? Because he --
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Sure. 
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MS. VANDYKE: Actually, we already --
SPEAKER #2: Can I make a suggestion? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. VANDYKE: The rec -- medical records 
stipulation has been out there for two weeks, and we 
already admitted I iabiIity over a week ago, so those 
were already known. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
SPEAKER #2: I'd like to --
THE COURT: Go ahead. I'd I ike -- I want to 
hear your suggestion. 
SPEAKER #2: I haven't spoken to Counsel 
about th i s, so I guess psych i c powers (i naud i bIe.) 
Here's the thing. With that agreement we have one 
witness, okay? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
SPEAKER #2: Which is our medical expert. I 
don't know how many witnesses they have. But I can 
tell you that. That's our witness, okay? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
SPEAKER #2: So why don't they teI I me who 
their witnesses are, and then we can cut through this. 
MS. VANDYKE: We provided our pretrial 
disclosures --
THE COURT: Who - -
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MS. VANDYKE: -- and those are our witnesses. 
SPEAKER #2: Which was, your Honor, about as 
extensive as ours. 
MR. WARD: Oh. 
THE COURT: How many, how many, how many do 
you have? 
MR. WARD: Easily. 
THE COURT: How many do you have? 
MS. VANDYKE: I think there's five I isted on 
there. And Iet me puI I it out, I have it attached. 
THE COURT: So you've got five and he's got 
one. I'm Iook i ng at a ha If a dozen w i tnesses totaI on 
this thing? 
SPEAKER #2: Those, those were their wi 11 
calls. And then they, they did the same thing, your 
Honor, they I i sted a 11 of the med i caI prov i ders --
MS. VANDYKE: We I isted --
SPEAKER #2: -- as may calls, like we did. I 
mean, it's --
THE COURT: Okay. 
SPEAKER #2: You know, it's standard 
pract i ce. 
MS. VANDYKE: No. We listed 7 individuals 
versus 60, your Honor. 
MR. WARD: We listed seven (inaudible.) 
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THE COURT Okay. So, so the anticipation is 
we'11 sti 11 get through in four days? 
MR. WARD: Oh, absolutely. 
SPEAKER #2: 
THE COURT 
MR. WARD: E 
Sure. 
Okay. 
3ut our problem with the 
(inaudible) is we, we don't know whose (inaudible.) 
He's 1 i sted 60 names 
THE COURT 
And so we --
But he's now told you, he's now 
told you he's down to one. His doctor. 
MS. VANDYKE : But, but you know what? We 
have no 1i st of any documents. He 1 i sted 60 names for 
the documents. Not for the witnesses --
SPEAKER #2: 
MS. VANDYKE 







: -- for the documents they were 
1 --
He 1isted 60 names. 
Another suggestion? 
Yes. 
1 will g i ve them cop i es of the 




They can give me copies of the 
documents they intend to introduce into evidence. 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. VANDYKE: That wi I I be great. Can we set 
a date for that? 
SPEAKER #2: With the medical records 
stipulation, your Honor --
THE COURT: Yes. 
SPEAKER #2: --it strikes me, the only 
medical records that need to come into evidence are 
those that anyone thinks have specific meaning to the 
injuries that we're now dealing with. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
SPEAKER #2: Okay? So I think those should 
be marked separately, by either party, to the extent 
they i ntend to use them at tr i a I. Other than that, we 
stipulated that the medical records are in evidence. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
SPEAKER #2: Is that fair, your Honor? 
THE COURT: How long are you gonna need? Is 
the 17th too late? 
MS. VANDYKE: I thought we stipulated to 
founda --
SPEAKER #2: That's fine with me. 
MS. VANDYKE: -- foundation only. Not all 
that the med i caI records were adm i ss i bIe. I'm sorry, 
but that's what -- the agreement that we've signed off 
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need date -- dates for exchange of 
COURT: 1 said. 
VANDYKE: -- and j ury i nstruct i ons, 1 
next step. Is that what we're talking? 
COURT: Well, no. 1 want to --
VANDYKE: Oh. 
COURT: 1 want to deal with this. 
VANDYKE: What? 
COURT: Your exchange of witnesses. 
SPEAKER #2: Of exhibits? 1 
THE 





(1naud i b1e.) 
COURT: And, and your proposed documents. 
--
VANDYKE: 1've a 1 ready prov i ded those, 
COURT: Okay. 
WARD: We don't have anything to change. 
SPEAKER #2: Your Honor --
MS. VANDYKE: We've already provided it. 
SPEAKER #2: -- if Counsel is saying that 1 
they are not st i pu1 at i ng to the adm i ss i b i1i ty of the 
medical records into evidence? All bets are now off. 
MS. VANDYKE: Okay. 
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THE COURT: You're, you're not st i puI at i ng to 
the medical records? 
MS. VANDYKE: Well, your Honor --
THE COURT: I --
MS. VANDYKE: -- because we don't know what 
they are yet. 
SPEAKER #2: You've got -- everything we've 
got has been produced by them, your Honor. 
MR. WARD: Your Honor, that's not true. He 
sends us a I ist of 60 names -- half of them we don't 
even recogn i ze -- of records that he ca11s med i caI 
records that he's gonna put in, and he wants us to 
stipulate to them. 
SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, I --
MR. WARD: We don't even know what he's 
talking about. 
SPEAKER #2: I --
MS. VANDYKE: I have it right here. May I 
approach and just give you the Iist? 
SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, I'm wiI I -- I'm 
w iI Ii ng to teI I you --
THE COURT: Okay. 
SPEAKER #2: -- as I'm standing here today. 
I have no medical records that they did not provide to 
me. I w i 11 not seek to put i n ev i dence any med i caI 
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record that they did not provide to me. But I need a 
st i puI at i on as to adm i ss i b i I i ty i nto ev i dence, or eIse 
we're gonna be here for a couple of weeks. 
THE COURT: So he's now offering to 
stipulate --
MS. VANDYKE: Just --
THE COURT: -- to a I I of your medical 
records, and he will produce no red -- medical records 
that you haven't produced to him. Are you accepting 
that? 
MS. VANDYKE: The problem is, your Honor, 
without seeing them, I don't know --we signed 
releases. And they have stacks and stacks of records, 
some of wh i ch may be i nadm i ss i bIe because they're 
irrelevant, prejudicial. I don't know unti I I see 
them. 
I've got such a wide -- she's 55 years old. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. VANDYKE: As you're aware, there's OB/GYN 
Ii sted on the i r records, there's -- I don't know what 
the records are untiI we get some answer. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: (Inaud i bIe.) 
MS. VANDYKE: All I want is their pretrial 
disclosures, and then I think we can enter --we can 
make a better assessment. 
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1 i t t 1 
to go 
THE COURT: 
e bit confused 
through your 
Okay. So what -- I'm, I'm, I'ma 
But te11 me, he -- you want him 
records and tel1 you which of your 
records that he intends to rely upon? 
gonna 
He's te11 i 
rely upon any 
produced. And --
ng me blanket, up front, he's not 
med i ca1 
MS. VANDYKE: We'11 







in addition to the ones 








records that you haven't 
, we'11 g i ve him a copy of 
yes. We're j ust ask i ng 
; we're submitting he gives 
to adm i t. That'sail. 





MS. VANDYKE: Okay. 
SPEAKER #2 
a stipulation 
because otherwise 1 
these 
st i pu 
prov i ders. 
THE COURT: 
: But --
as to adrr 
He, he --
1'm wrong. 
Let's set a date for 
 and 1 want to know if we 
i i ss i b i1i ty of those, 
've gotta get subpoenas out for all 
Well, 1 
1 at i on as to adm i ss i b i1 
think you have a 
ity, subject to you two 
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We can do that in five days. 
I agree, everybody gets to look 
Okay, let's do that. And if 
has an objection --
THE COURT: 
SPEAKER #2: 




















Bring it back. 
-- let's raise it within three 
we can come back up here and 
I agree. I agree. 
Okay? 
: Okay. Back to the original 
objection to their pretrial 
get a new pretrial disclosure? 
one witness and it wi I I take him 
fine. 
as i t stands, when he's 1i sted over 110 





in and we've 
THE COURT: 
WelI, don't --
: That means they can calI 110 
lost our objection. 
But he has stipulated today on 
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the record -- which you may reduce to writing if you 
want to --
MS. VANDYKE: Okay. 
THE COURT: -- he only intends to call one 
w i tness. 
MS. VANDYKE: Okay. Great. 
THE COURT: And who is that, the doctor? 
SPEAKER #2: The doctor. Based on the 
st i puI at i on as to adm i ss i b iIi ty of med i caI records. 
THE COURT: Right. 
SPEAKER #2: If that isn't stipulated to, 
your Honor, I'm gonna calI whoever I need to calI to 
get them into evidence. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. VANDYKE: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. And, and that will be 
cured, because you'll both look at the records and 
dec i de what med i caI records you're gonna have come i n. 
And he's gonna -- and he said for the record today 
that whatever records you gave him is what he's 
considering fair game, so. 
MR. WARD: Can we agree that we'I I have 
everything exchanged by Monday? He gives us his, and 
we'11 give us -- him ours? 
THE COURT: Monday is fine, the 8th. 
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MR. WARD: Is t h a t okay? 
MS. VANDYKE: No. 
MR. WARD: (Inaudible) is that okay? 
(Inaud i bIe) you want to go Iater? 
THE COURT: You want to go the 12th? 
SPEAKER #2: Yeah, give us the 12th, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: We'I I go the 12th, Friday. 
MS. VANDYKE: Okay, so 9/12. 
And what about, do you prefer a stipulated 
set of jury instructions too, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Well, my traditional preference 
has been you have a 11 my stocks. The on Iy ones I 
really want from both sides are the ones that you 
th i nk are part i cuIar to your case i f you d i sI i ke my 
stocks. You can ask Ms. AI I en and she'II maiI out the 
stocks to you. 
UsuaMy I give my stock instructions, and 
then we argue over the ones that you may think are 
appiicable to the Plaintiff's case and you may think 
are applicable to the Defendant's cases. Those are 
the ones -- I don't want you both to submit to me the 
jury can take notes, that they need to pay attention, 
that preponderance of the evidence, you know. 
But which one you want to use for causation, 
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which one you want to use for damages. I mean, I 
don't know if there's lost wages, general damages, 
specific damages, future wages, reductions, 
actuarials. I mean, I don't know enough about your 
case to know those specifics. 
So those kinds of instructions, yes. And I 
wouId Iike those by the 17th. 
MS. VANDYKE: Seventeenth. 
THE COURT: But bas i ca11y I'm gonna g i ve my 
stock instructions, and then we'I I argue about 
whatever instructions you want specifically given to 
your case. 
SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, where can I get your 
stocks? 
THE COURT: She -- just telI Ms. Allen you 
want them and she'11 down Ioad them off the computer or 
she'I I send you a d i sk. 
MS. ALLEN: I, I have them i n back. I can 
run and get you each a copy if you, if you want me to. 
SPEAKER #2: Oh, that would be super. 
THE COURT: Yeah, we can do that today. 
SPEAKER #2: (Inaudible) voir dire, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Voir dire. I usually allow -- I 
usually start the voir dire. I ask a few questions, 
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because my concern is to make sure that we have a 
general panel. Then I turn it over and I do allow 
attorneys to conduct their own voir dire. 
The only thing I reserve is -- I'm pretty 
I i beraI. But I'll usua11y cut you off at the knees i f 
I think you're getting out of I ine, rather than taint 
the who Ie poo I. I th i nk you're ent i 11ed to ask 
reasonable questions that help you exercise preemptory 
chaI Ienges. 
But if I find that you are educating the 
jury, or you're trying to lay the foundation for your 
theory of the case i n such a way you're try i ng to 
argue it or convince them as opposed to just giving 
them examples, I'll probably cut you off. We'I I 
excuse the j ury. And we'I I taIk about where you're 
head i ng. 
But I do a 11ow you f u11 re i n to f o11ow up 
because I don't have to exercise preemptory 
cha11enges, you do. And so there may be some nuances 
as to why you wouId want to excuse a juror for some 
reason less than cause that's not important to me. 
I usually start with the Plaintiff, then I 
give the defense foI Iow up. You have fu11 rein. If 
there are questions that you want me to ask -- a lot 
of t i mes tort I i ab iI i ty quest i ons or those k i nds of 
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th i ngs -- I wouId I i ke those by the 17th as we I I. The 
questions that you want me to ask. 
Sometimes they come across better if the 
judge is asking those questions. But by and large I 
let you guys -- you folks ask whatever questions you 
want to ask. 
MR. WARD: How big will our pool be, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: We 11, I was gonna ask you how b i g 
you thought we needed it to be. Our -- I've heard of 
Schindler Elevator Company. I don't know Ms. Florez. 
Twenty-five is normally -- 25/35 is what we calI. I 
have gone to 50 in high profi le cases, but. 
MR. WARD: I would think 25 to 30 would be 
fine. 
THE COURT: Because we only need eight. 
SPEAKER #2: That should be fine. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WARD: I think one other thing I was 
gonna have, have an opportunity to mention this to 
Scott or to you, your Honor, but I be Iieve this -- for 
us to discuss. 
I have found everybody we 11 served in tri a Is 
with this kind of adjusted schedule that you may have 
heard about, where you start your trial at 8 and end 
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it Iike at 2:30. So that they can get back to thei r 
office in Salt Lake, and everybody has some time. 
I have some j udges that Iove to do that, and 
we've done that. I've had other j udges say, No, I 
want to do the norma I 9 to 5. And I, and I j ust Ieave 
it out there for whatever. Since they're travel ing 
from Sa11 Lake (i naud i bIe.) 
SPEAKER #2: I think it's, I think it's a 
great schedule, your Honor. I've done it quite a bit, 
and (i naud i bIe.) 
THE COURT: I don't, I don't have a problem 
with it, as long as you guys know I'm butting up 
against another trial that starts on the 29th. You 
have to be through in four days. I -- and I am 
breaking Wednesday. We're going Monday, Tuesday, 
break Wednesday, and come back Thursday and Friday, 
so. 
MR. WARD: With, with them admitting 
I i ab iI i ty and hav i ng the i r one ma i n w i tness I can't 
imagine --
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WARD: -- just can't imagine we wouldn't 
be done. 
THE COURT: I don't mind breaking earlier in 
the day, 2:30, 3:00. That, that's fine. 
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we' re 
Honor 
SPEAKER #2 : Just, just so we 














So I don't, I don 
Is everybody okay 
Oh, I don't know 






That's why (inaudi 
I -- when you sai 
(Inaud i bIe.) 
I was thinking, I 
're clear, what 
igence, your 
't have any 
with an 8:00 
if my staff's 
ble.) 
d --
was thinking in 





SPEAKER UNKNOWN: The j urors, 
here a Iittle 
(inaudible.) 
THE COURT: 
bit early, so the 
We'd be -- if we' 
we'd have to start at 8:30 would 
ear 1i est, because the bu i1d i ng doesn't 
the j urors have 
door will have 
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eight. So I've got problems getting jurors in at 7:30 
to be here at 8. That --
MR. WARD: So it opens at 8:30, or it opens 
at 8? 
THE COURT: No, it opens at 8. So I could 
have them in the building, searched, and ready to go 
at 8:30. I -- she's right, I can't have them ready to 
go at 8 because we don't open the bu iId i ng that --
MR. WARD: Then maybe we could, if everybody 
would agree, lunch would be 30 or 40 minutes instead 
of an hour or an hour and-a-half. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WARD: (Inaudible) kind of get the 
business done so everybody can go home. 
THE COURT: I don't have a problem with that. 
So we'11 plan on starting at 8:30. 
MR. WARD: Okay. 
THE COURT: And capping the day somewhere 
around three, depending upon witnesses. My -- I'll be 
candid. My experience with the flex days is we've 
been held hostage by our witnesses. Particularly 
doctors, who can only come a certain day at a certain 
time. 
And so you folks move through the case much 
faster than they do, and then we've got a two-hour 
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But yes, 1 don't have any 
ng at 8:30. 1 don't have any 
.with capping it at 3:00. 1 don't have any 
. with flexib 














i 1ity during the lunch hour 
we almost have to say that's the 
re gonna take, but day-to-day we 
we are with our witness. 
Yeah. 
Okay. 
Yeah. With regard to that, my, 
scheduled to be here on Thursday. 
Okay. 
1 assume that would be a good 
That wou1d be an exce11ent t i me. 
1 assume we have some 





--we need to take them out of 
Yes. 
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Yeah, we can take them out of 
Is that Thursday morning? 
: Yeah, Thursday morning. 
Yeah, okay. Anything else we 
We'11 see you a 11 back on the 
8:30, ready to go. Thank you. 
MR. WARD: 
your Honor, 1 
Wei 1, if we're gonna start at 
wonder, particularly if we have 
jury instructions or anything to go through at 
should we get together on a phone conference 
maybe the day before? 
THE COURT: 












We 11, 1, I'm expect i ng you to 
Dy the 17th. 
(Inaud i bIe.) 
I wi I I review them, and then I'll 
I'll, I'11 fo11ow up on that i f we 
Okay. 
: Okay. 
So maybe we can think of things 
if we need to --
Right. 
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MR. WARD: -- tie ends up? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. WARD: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
SPEAKER #2: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Have a good day. 
(End of recording.) 
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